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Harmonizing ‘Converted Wetland’ Under the  
Clean Water Act and Food Security Act  
Would Reaffirm Congress’s Intent To Limit  
EPA and Army Corps 404 Jurisdiction© 
 




This Article explains the legal significance of the federal 
agency designation of a farm or field as a “converted wetland” 
(“CW”), considering Congress’s use of the terms of art “wetland” 
and “converted wetland” in the statutory text of the Food Security 
Act of 1985 (“FSA”). It also explains how the plain textual 
meaning of these terms can and should be used to reaffirm 
Congress’s intent to limit federal agency wetland jurisdiction 
under the 1977 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 404 amendments over 
historical mixed-use wet pasturelands converted to croplands for 
economically beneficial purposes.   
In support of this thesis, the Article explores: (1) the 
historical underpinnings of CWA § 404; (2) the critical importance 
of plain textual meaning especially in CWA wetlands litigation; 
(3) how contrary to plain textual meaning federal courts 
exclusively inferred from politically contentious and ambivalent 
legislative history CWA § 404 coverage of non-tidal inland 
wetlands located adjacent to manmade ditches and converted 
wetlands; (4) how contrary to plain textual meaning federal 
courts ignored the explicit text of the Food Security Act of 1985 
calling for the safe harbor treatment of certain converted 
wetlands; and (5) how federal district courts’ exercise of their 
inherent equity jurisdiction can be employed to entertain post-
judgment 60(b) motions in CWA § 404 enforcement actions, 
thereby enabling the reexamination of previously controversial 
wetland determinations to reach a just and fair result for farmers 
and ranchers.   
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Lastly, this Article recommends that the district court in 
United States v. Brace1 and other similar actions apply this 
analysis for the purpose of equitably resolving such disputes.  
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CLEAN WATER ACT §404 
 
From the time the Nixon administration created the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and secured enactment 
of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (“FWCPA”),2 a growing environmental movement influenced 
Congress.3 Under this influence, Congress, in 1972, expanded the 
 
*Author Info  Lawrence A. Kogan is managing principal of The Kogan Law 
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1 United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994), rev’g,No.90-229 
(W.D.Pa.Dec.16,1993) (this reversal led Brace to enter into a consent agreement with the 
Government which the district court entered on September 23, 1996. Although the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture had acknowledged that Brace had fully implemented the 
consent decree by late December 1996, the case docket does not reflect that the 
Government ever sought or secured a Court order reaffirming that Brace had fully 
satisfied the consent decree. The Government subsequently alleged Brace had violated the 
1996 consent decree by having committed certain “unauthorized” acts within and 
surrounding the consent decree area during 2013 and 2014, and it brought suit to enforce 
the consent decree on January 9, 2017.); see United States’ Mot. To Enforce Consent 
Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 1, United States v. Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 4, 1990), ECF No. 82; see also United States’ Mem. Of Law in Support of Mot. to 
Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 1, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF 
No. 83. 
2 See Lawrence A. Kogan, CWA § 404: How So Few Words Re Wetlands Have So 
Greatly Impaled Private Property Rights, KY. J. OF EQUINE AGRI. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 
SIXTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM (Feb. 28, 2020), http://www.kjeanrl.com/previoussymposiums 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/D32W-255N].  
3 See Lawrence A. Kogan, The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States’ 
Wetland Laws and Regulations (at the Expense of Americans’ Constitutionally Protected 
Private Property Rights), 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 687, 697 (2019), , 
https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/lr/vol2019/iss3/3/ [https://perma.cc/7BHA-SDEU]; see 
also Meir Rinde, Richard Nixon and the Rise of American Environmentalism, SCI. HIST. 
INST. (June 2, 2017), https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/magazine/richard-nixon-
and-the-rise-of-american-environmentalism [https://perma.cc/4FSE-GELU]; Annie Snider, 
Clean Water Act: Vetoes by Eisenhower, Nixon Presaged Today’s Partisan Divide, EE 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059971457 [https://perma.cc/2DNV-
HWPR] (noting that the FWCPA later became known as the clean water act).  




scope of FWCPA jurisdiction over direct land-based discharges 
from “navigable waters” to “waters of the United States.”4 
Before the 1972 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) amendments, 
the term “navigable waters,” as used in the Acts of July 7, 18385 
and August 30, 18526 regulating steamboats moving on the 
“navigable waters of the United States,” had been defined 
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in The 
Daniel Ball, as waters “navigable in fact.”7 The Court based its 
determination on the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, rather than common law.8 Historical accounts of the 
CWA’s evolution confirmed the focus of Congress’s amendments 
to the CWA were to regulate companies discharging hazardous 
pollutants (chemicals) from point sources “on small, non-
navigable tributaries” (i.e., on rivers or streams not navigable in 
fact).9 Indeed, the focus was not to control small nonpoint sources 
of soil erosion and surface water runoff from small and medium-
sized farmlands, which environmentalists and the EPA now 
claim affects offsite water quality.10 To achieve its objective, 
Congress “asserted jurisdiction over ‘waters of the United States’ 
[…by] simply equat[ing] this term with ‘navigable waters.’”11  
 
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
86 Stat. 816-865 (1972).  
5 An Act to Provide for the Better Security of the Lives of Passengers on Board of 
Vessels Propelled in Whole or in part by Steam, 25th Cong., Sess. II., Ch. 191, Secs. 2 and 
3, 5 Stat. 304 (1838). 
6 An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act to provide for the better Security of 
the lives of Passengers on board of Vessels propelled in whole or in part by Steam,’ and for 
other purposes, 32nd Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 105, 106 (1852). 
7 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1871) (holding that “public navigable rivers in law […] are 
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition as highways for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted 
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”).  
8 Id. (“And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the 
meaning of the acts of Congress, […] when they form in their ordinary condition by 
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is 
or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries in the customary modes in 
which such commerce is conducted by water.”); See also The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
430, 440-42 (1874) (this two-part definition ultimately became important to the definition 
of federal territorial jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.); see infra. 
9 See Arthur Holst, Clean Water Act, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Clean-Water-Act [https://perma.cc/RRU5-KFMM] (last 
viewed Nov. 25, 2020); see also ENVIRONMENTAL WORKS, History of the Clean Water Act, 
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.environmentalworks.com/history-of-the-clean-water-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/XR58-C5PQ]. 
10 Michael Blumm and D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean 
Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 
60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 704 (1989).  
11 Id.; see also CWA § 502(7).  
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While the “EPA quickly embraced a broad jurisdiction for 
its permit program under section 402 of the Act [overseeing State 
CWA implementation of point source pollution], the Corps 
resisted,”12 having had more limited enforcement jurisdiction 
under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.13 “To the Corps, 
[CWA] section 404 was simply an exemption from the new EPA 
permit system for its preexisting regulatory program.”14 This 
difference in perspective created uncertainty about the Corps’s 
role in implementing the FWCPA/CWA.15 As a result, 
environmental activist groups initiated litigation in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1974,16 challenging 
the Corps’s narrow regulatory interpretation of its jurisdiction.17  
On March 27, 1975, the district court issued an order 
directing the Corps to promulgate proposed regulations “clearly 
reflecting the full mandate of the [CWA].”18 The Corps responded 
to that court order on May 6, 1975, when it issued proposed 
 
12 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10; Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, supra note 4. 
13An Act Making Appropriations for the Construction, Repair, and Preservation 
of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, and for other Purposes, 55th Cong., Sess. 
III. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 1-54). 
14 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10.  
15 Id. 
16 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).  
17 See Permits for Activities in Navigable or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 
12119 (Apr. 3, 1974) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209.120) (final regulations prescribing the 
policies, practice and procedures to be followed in the processing of Department of Army 
permits authorizing structures and work in or affecting navigable waters of the United 
States pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 401 et seq..), and the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters pursuant to Section 404 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1344), inter alia.) [https://perma.cc/S9XY-
RTRK].  Significantly, in a 1988 magazine interview, Charles Hollis, former Chief of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Branch in Wilmington, North Carolina, 
admitted that, prior to the enactment of the Food Security Act of 1985, “[t]he Army Corps 
ha[d] generally enforced 404 permits only on the coast” due to “the public’s opposition to 
land-use regulations in general.” See Suzanne Goyer, What Are Wetlands?, North 
Carolina Insight (March 1988), 73-74, at 74, https://nccppr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/What_Are_Wetlands.pdf .  See also Lawrence S. Earley, Hope For 
Our Wetlands, 51 Wildlife in North Carolina 4, 7 (Sept. 1987), 
https://ia800202.us.archive.org/15/items/wildlifeinnorthc51nort/wildlifeinnorthc51nort.pdf 
(quoting Charles Hollis, chief of the regulatory branch of the U.S. Corps of Engineers in 
Wilmington – “Before this law [Food Security Act of 1985 ‘swampbuster’ provision], 
farmers were exempt from the wetland protection provisions of Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act. ‘A farmer could do just about anything he wanted without having 404 bother 
him,’ he says. ‘Now, he’s no longer exempt and the wetlands issue is on his head.’”). 
18 392 F.Supp. at 686 (directing the Corps to publish “proposed regulations 
clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act.”). 




regulations setting forth four alternative regulatory proposals, 19 
ranging from that most favored by environmentalists, extending 
to inland as well as coastal tidal wetlands and waters 
(Alternative 1),20 to that most favored by the Corps (Alternative 
4), imposing more limited jurisdiction.21 Environmentalist groups 
immediately charged the Corps with scaremongering when the 
press release it had issued prefacing these proposed regulations 
warned farmers and ranchers that stock pond alterations, 
irrigation ditch modifications, and field plowing under 
Alternative 1 would be subject to 404 permitting.22 Eventually, 
the Corps was compelled to revise its regulations to more broadly 
exercise jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.”23  
Ongoing public debates over the scope of the FWPCA 
regulations continued between 1972 and 1975, despite the 
Corps’s efforts in adjusting its regulations to satisfy the 
environmental movement’s broad interpretation of Congress’s 
 
19 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 
19766-19768 (May 6, 1975) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209) (prescribing proposed 
regulations setting forth four alternatives pertaining to the regulation by the Corps under 
FWPCA (CWA) 404 of discharges of dredge or fill material in navigable waters.). 
20 Id. at 19767 ( Under “Alternative 1,” the Corps’s “jurisdiction over the disposal 
of dredged or fill material would extend to virtually every coastal and inland artificial or 
natural waterbody,” including “all navigable waters of the United States […] up to their 
headwaters.” It would “also extend to all coastal, riverine, estuarine and lake waters 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward […] regardless of whether those wetlands 
are regularly or only periodically inundated by saltwater, brackish water, or fresh water.”) 
(emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 19768 (Under “Alternative 4,” the Corps adopted “the limited definition 
of Alternative 2, and the initial State certification and authorization requirements of 
Alternative 3 prior to any processing of the section 404 application for the disposal of 
dredged and fill material in waters other than navigable waters of the United States.”);  
See also id. at 19767 (Under “Alternative 2,” “[j]urisdiction over inland waters under this 
limited definition would include all navigable waters of the United States up to their 
headwaters and all primary tributaries of such waters up to their headwaters. In addition, 
no section 404 permits would be required for the discharge of dredged or fill material 
amounting to 100 cubic yards or less into primary tributaries of navigable waters of the 
United States or into waters beyond the head of navigation of navigable waters of the 
United States.”). 
22 James Curtiss, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Correction in the 
Section 404 Program, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1092, 1103 (1978) (citing 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 145 
(1975). 
23 See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44585, EVOLUTION OF 
THE MEANING OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 10 (2019); 
see also “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS): Current Status of the 2015 Clean Water 
Rule, EVERYCRSREPORT (Dec. 6, 2018 – Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45424.html [https://perma.cc/B346-6PEG] 
(stating the Army Corps of Engineers… [has] defined the term in regulations several 
times as part of their implementation of the act”). 
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intent.24 Once President Ford became involved in this debate 
during July 1976, the U.S. Senate initiated hearings “to 
reconsider the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under section 
404.”25 The Congressional debates that followed dramatically 
expanded CWA § 404 and were publicly portrayed as a putative 
“compromise” of competing interests.26 However, public debates 
were renewed over the scope of CWA § 404 soon after the EPA 
and the Corps issued implementing regulations, reflecting that 
the compromise had overlooked the objections of the nation’s 
small and medium-sized farmers and ranchers.27 
It bears repeating that a review of the Corps’s 1974 CWA § 
404-implementing regulations reveals the definition of “navigable 
waters of the United States” covered waters “subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide, and/or presently, or have been in the past, or 
may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate 
or foreign commerce.”28 U.S. navigable waters had not then been 
expressly extended to cover freshwater wetlands adjacent to 
nontidal tributaries of U.S. navigable waters.29 The interim final 
regulations the Corps later issued on July 25, 1975, however, 
included “periodically inundated freshwater wetlands contiguous 
with or adjacent to navigable waters, periodically inundated 
freshwater wetlands contiguous with or adjacent to navigable 
waters, and…certain interstate waters based on non-
transportation impacts on interstate commerce.”30  
Final July 19, 1977 Corps regulations implementing CWA 
§ 404 explicitly excluded wetlands adjacent to tributaries to U.S. 
 
24 MULLIGAN, supra note 23, at 10–12. 
25 Curtiss, supra note 22, at 1105–06.  
26 See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10, at 727; see also Clean Water Act of 1977 
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); see also United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 39209 (1977)) 
(stating “[t]he Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s approach: efforts to narrow the 
definition of ‘waters’ were abandoned; the legislation as ultimately passed, in the words of 
Senator Baker, ‘retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters 
exercised in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.’”).  
27 See Curtiss, supra note 22, at 1107–12.  
28 The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United 
States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22250, 22254 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 
12115, 12119 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 209.120) (1974) and referencing the Corps’s 1975 
interim regulations).  
29 See id. (“Environmental organizations challenged the Corps’ 1974 
regulations…arguing that the Corps’ definition of “navigable waters” was inadequate 
because it did not include tributaries or coastal marshes above the mean high tide mark or 
wetlands above the ordinary high-water mark.”) 
30 Id.; see also Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 
Fed. Reg. 31319, 31320, 31324 (July 25, 1975) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(h)). 




navigable waters from the coverage of “waters of the United 
States” (“WOTUS”) where said “tributaries” actually were 
“manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on 
dry land.”31 Those final regulations defined the term “adjacent” as 
“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.”32 In this context, “dry 
land” meant other than “wetlands,” which had been redefined as 
follows: 
 
Those areas that are inundated or saturated by 
surface or ground water at a frequency and 
duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of 
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated 
soil conditions. Wetlands generally include 
swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.33 
 
The preamble to the Corps’s 1977 final regulations clarified the 
agency had not intended “to assert jurisdiction over those areas 
that once were wetlands and part of an aquatic system, but 
which, in the past, have been transformed into dry land for 
various purposes.”34 Despite the absence of any 1977 CWA 
statutory text expressing Congress’s intent to subject the 
discharge of dredged or fill materials into non-tidal wetlands 
adjacent to manmade ditches not considered WOTUS to federal 
CWA § 404 permitting, the EPA and Corps officials inferred such 
congressional intent from historical legislative debates.35 
As noted in the Introduction, this Article discusses how, in 
United States v. Brace, EPA exercised jurisdiction and control 
over nontidal wetlands adjacent to manmade drainage and 
irrigation ditches pursuant to CWA § 404, and ignored that Brace 
had secured distinct legal treatment under the Food Security Act 
of 1985.36 In 1987, multiple federal government agencies had 
deployed to the Brace farm and concluded Brace “converted” an 
approximately 30-acre tract from nontidal wetlands adjacent to 
 
31 Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of the United 
States, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (July 19, 1977) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(3)).  
32 Id. at 37129 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)).  
33 Id. at 37128 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c)).  
34 Id.  
35 CWA 1977 Amendments, Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, at § 
404(g)(1). 
36 Brace, 41 F.3d at 121. 
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manmade dual function drainage/irrigation ditches.37 Yet, the 
U.S. Government refused to recognize that wetlands (wet 
pasturelands) conversion for agricultural crop production 
purposes qualified for exclusion from CWA § 404 jurisdiction 
under this regulation because the land did not continue to 
demonstrate “wetland” features.38 The Government also refused 
to recognize that Brace had secured a “commenced conversion” 
designation from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, enabling 
him to complete that conversion within 10 years’s time to secure 
protected “prior converted wetland” status under the Food 
Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”).39  
When the U.S. Government initiated its consent decree 
enforcement action against Brace on January 9, 2017, it again 
ignored such evidence. In fact, the defendants in Brace were 
accused, once again, of not securing required CWA § 404 permits 
to engage in normal farming activities and recognized 
agricultural ditch maintenance-related activities in and around 
the approximate 30-acre consent decree area, even though the 
Government had never delineated that area, and EPA and Corps 
officials had provided express verbal authorization to the 
defendants to undertake such activities on two of their three 
adjacent, privately-owned, hydrologically integrated farm tracts 
operated as a single farm.40  
While on the same farm, the tracts in question are 
separated from one another.41 The EPA alleges the violations 
occurred on separate fields, consistent with the legal precedent 
enabling federal agency officials to arbitrarily divide operating 
farms into subunits (e.g., farm tracts and, even, farm fields) each 
of which would be treated as separate “farms” for purposes of 
1977 CWA § 404 wetlands enforcement. The U.S. Government’s 
treatment of these adjacent farm tract fields as separate “farms” 
in the absence of express congressional direction to cover non-
 
37 Id. at 119–20. 
38 Id. at 124–26. 
39 See discussion infra. 
40 See United States’ Mot. To Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated 
Penalties, supra note 1, at 1; see also United States’ Mem. Of Law in Support of Mot. to 
Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties, supra note 1, at 1.  
41 See Defendants’ Resp. and Opp’n to United States Second Mot. to Enforce 
Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 4–5, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 
214; see also United States’ Resp. in Opp’n to Defendants’ Redrafted 60(b)(5) Mot. to 
Vacate Consent Decree and Deny Stipulated Penalties at 12, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, 
ECF No. 318.  




tidal wetlands adjacent to manmade ditches has allowed federal 
agencies to misinterpret and overzealously enforce the CWA 
normal farming activities and agricultural ditch construction and 
maintenance exemptions and the recapture provision, with 
devastating effects to the nation’s small and medium-sized 
farms.42 
The federal courts allowed federal agencies to ignore the 
rich agricultural histories of specific regions of the nation, 
including the extensively documented, centuries-old, 
mixed/diversified pastureland and cropland farming and use of 
tile drainage systems in the Erie Pennsylvania region.43 Federal 
courts also compelled farmers, including the Brace defendants, to 
concede the issue of whether or not there existed wetlands, as a 
matter of science and as a matter of federal jurisdiction, on the 
sites/areas in question. The courts redefined “established normal 
farming activities” with respect to only the wetland site/area in 
question, exclusive of the other areas of the farm or specific farm 
tract of which the wetlands is an integral part.44 In those few 
 
42 CWA § 404(f)(1)(A)–(C).  
43 See Pennsylvania Agricultural History Project, PA. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM 
COMM’N, http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NDZ-YYPT]; Historic Agricultural Resources of Pennsylvania c 1700-
1960, PA. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMM’N, 
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/history/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/QR5T-PJGX]; Northwestern Woodland, Grassland, and Specialized 
Farming Region, c. 1830-1960, PA. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMM’N, 
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/northwestern_w
oodland.pdf (containing a case-relevant historical account of northwestern Pennsylvania 
agriculture accompanying a U.S. National Park Service National Historic Places 
registration, at 11-13, 16-18, 34-35, 48-50, 52, 54-56, 91-92, 94-5, 97, 136-137, and 
identifying, on p. 137, how “contradictions in Federal postures towards wetlands were 
coming to a head.” And how “farmer Robert Brace and the federal government tangled 
over his attempts to drain a 30 acre parcel of his farm.”) [https://perma.cc/3G9B-J5D4]; 
Lake Erie Fruit and Vegetable Belt, 1870-1960, PA. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMM’N, 
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/lake_erie_fruit.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZJU8-F7DL]; Historic Agricultural Resources of Pennsylvania, 1700-
1960: National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form, PA. 
HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMM’N, 
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/mpdf_introducti
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PYX-WX8Q]; see also 2019 Updates to PA’s Agricultural History 
Project: Additional Guidance for Using Pennsylvania’s Agricultural Context, PA. HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION OFFICE (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.phmc.pa.gov/Preservation/About/Documents/Ag%20Context%20Guidance%20
Update%20November%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3CP-V5EN]. 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(wherein the approximately 2,900-acre portion consisting of wetlands locally known as the 
“Big Swamp” of a farmer’s purchase of 9,600 acres overall in northern California that had 
generally been farmed since 1897, was deemed not to have been previously “farmed” 
because the 2900-acre portion had “’never been subjected to any established upland 
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cases where federal agencies prepared and considered scientific 
wetland determinations, the courts reviewed such science in the 
absence of defendant rebuttal science.45  
In effect, the federal courts, in most cases, rubber-stamped 
agency determinations as federal wetland science continued to 
evolve. The deemed wetlands in question would be presumed to 
be “undisturbed” and as constituting the “normal circumstances” 
of the area in question.46 Federal courts also entertained the 
additional legal idea of normal farming activities, such as natural 
and cultivated pasturing and haying.47 As a result, any farmer or 
 
farming […]’ crop production.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Huebner, 752 
F. 2d 1235, 1239-42 (7th Cir. 1985) (wherein the Court found that a farmer’s purchase of a 
5,000-acre property known as “Bear Bluff Farms”, the largest continuous area of wetlands 
in Wisconsin, to expand three existing cranberry beds and “to use a portion of the farm for 
growing vegetables and other upland crops” (e.g., barley and corn) was deemed not to 
qualify for the “normal farming activities” exemption from CWA 404 permitting because 
the portion of the site/area in question had not been previously farmed with cranberry 
beds or upland crops, and also not to qualify for the agricultural ditch maintenance 
exemption because the deepening of the ditches expanded them beyond their prior 
dimensions. Applying the CWA 404 recapture provisions to each such exemption, the 
Court found that such activities consisting of “the side-casting and spreading activity 
reduced the reach of the wetlands surrounding the ditches at issue […and thereby 
brought] an area of navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject.”) 
(emphasis added).   
45 See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 
1983), slip op. at 4)–(16 (wherein the Court, after reviewing USEPA’s wetland delineation 
the Court had previously ordered, which “concluded that approximately eighty percent of 
the land [tract] was a wetland, […] decided that a section 404 permit was required for the 
land-clearing activities and that over ninety percent of the [20,000-acre] Lake Long Tract 
[lying within the 140,000 Bayou Natchitoches basin in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, which 
had previously been deforested and logged by other parties, and which was ‘subject to 
flooding during the spring months, and it experience[d] an average rainfall of sixty inches 
per year’], was a wetland.”) (emphasis added). 
46 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45032 (Aug. 25, 1993) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 and pt. 
328). (Where wetland delineations had been undertaken, as in the original case at bar, 
they were often based on the now-defunct 1989 Federal Manual for Identifying and 
Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands (“1989 Manual”). “Under the 1989 Manual, […] the 
phrase ‘normal circumstances,’ as applied to agricultural areas, meant the circumstances 
that would be present absent agricultural activity.” (emphasis added)). 
47 For example, during the 3-17-92 deposition of former longtime Waterford 
Township, PA resident Adrian Sharp, DOJ-ENRD counsel, David Dana had objected to 
Mr. Sharp’s use of the word “farming” for the purpose of distinguishing between crop 
farming and pasture or cattle farming for CWA purposes. “Q. Now, obviously you are 
familiar with the area. And would you – Your testimony is you are familiar with the 
farming practices in the general area? A. Oh, sure. Q. And that would include crop 
farming and pasture farming? A. Sure. Mr. Dana: There’s an objection as to – You can 
obviously use the word ‘farming’ as the witness understands it. But we may adopt a 
different definition of farming. For just general purposes. You might just want to – I just 
want it noted for the record. Mr. Ward: What other word would you use? Mr. Dana: Just to 
differentiate crop farming from pasture or cattle farming. Mr. Ward: So down the road 
your argument is going to be that cattle – raising beef or livestock is not agricultural? Mr. 
Dana: No, no. I’m not saying what our argument is. I just want it to be clear as to what 




rancher engaged in longstanding land-use rotations between 
wetland and non-wetland crops and/or conversions from wetland 
pasturing and haying to cropping would first need to secure 
federal agency approval through a time-consuming and very 
costly permitting process.  
  The aggressive EPA/Corps interpretation of the 1977 CWA 
§ 404(f)(2) recapture provision has certainly ensured this result. 
The EPA and the Corps have required § 404 permits for normal 
farming or agricultural ditch maintenance activities that 
otherwise would qualify for an exemption, if the discharge of 
dredged or fill material into U.S. navigable waters incidental to 
such activities had “as its purpose bringing an area of the 
navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously 
subject,” and “the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be 
impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced.”48 Corps 
implementing regulations refer to such “new” or “changed” uses 
as “conversion[s]” of wetlands concerning “waters of the United 
States,” but they do not define the term “converted wetland.”49  
Corps implementing regulations also presume a flow or 
circulation of such waters may be impaired if the “proposed 
discharge will result in significant discernible alterations to [the] 
flow or circulation.” 50 However, a “conversion” of wetlands is not 
required to meet this standard.51 However, these regulations 
ignored the Carter administration’s Council on Environmental 
Quality (“CEQ”) findings,52 which recognized normal farming 
activities could include converting wetlands to arable land and 
not be subject to recapture, so long as extensive areas of water 
and water bodies were not converted to dry land.53 
 
the witness is saying when he uses the word ‘farming’” (emphasis added). (Dep. of Adrian 
Sharp on March 17th, 1992 at 6–7, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 279-41.) 
48 Clean Water Act of 1977 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, at § 
404(f)(2) (1977).  
49 47 Fed. Reg. 31794 (July 22, 1982) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320-30).  
50 Id. at 31813, n.4 (codified at 33 C.F.R. part 323).  
51 See generally id. 
52 See The Ninth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, 
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 318 (Dec. 1978), 
https://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/august-1978-the-ninth-annual-report-of-the-
council-on-environmental-quality (“The filling or draining of wetlands does not necessarily 
waste the land, which may be turned into other valuable but competing uses. In fact, 24 
percent of all agricultural soils in nonfederal lands in the United States were originally 
wetland. One-half of wet soils (outside nonfederal lands) falls in the prime farmland class. 
With property management, some converted wetland soils can be highly productive 
farmlands for years, perhaps centuries.”) [https://perma.cc/88DJ-Z767]. 
53 123 Cong. Rec. 30, 38379, 39188 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie); see also id.  
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Aggressive EPA enforcement of §404 is based on a liberal 
interpretation of legislative history, apparently bolstered by the 
1979 opinion of Carter administration Attorney General 
Benjamin Civiletti.54 The Civiletti opinion concluded “the overall 
structure of the Clean Water Act impliedly place[d] responsibility 
on EPA to determine the scope of ‘navigable waters’ for the entire 
statute” (emphasis added).55 Civiletti candidly admitted he 
reached this conclusion even though “[t]he question is explicitly 
resolved neither in § 404 itself nor in its legislative history.”56 
Remarkably, the 1979 AG Opinion also inferred: 
 
[W]hile the Act charges the Secretary [of the Army] 
with the duty of issuing and assuring compliance 
with the terms of § 404 permits, it does not 
expressly charge him with responsibility for 
deciding when a discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the navigable waters takes place so 
that the § 404 permit requirement is brought into 
play. […] I therefore conclude that final authority 
under the Act to construe § 404(f) is also vested in 
the Administrator.57 
 
Since the Corps’s statutory permitting authority had been 
limited exclusively to § 404 discharges of dredged and fill 
materials, the Civiletti opinion could have easily construed the 
Corps’s more specific, narrow permitting authority as extending 
exclusively to its evaluation of the availability of § 404(f) dredge 
and fill activity permit exemptions. This would have been the 
more logical and reasonable interpretation, especially considering 
President Carter’s agricultural background and the significant 
public objections the 1977 CWA amendments received from the 
farming community. Thus, although CWA § 404(f) exempted 
certain point-source source discharge activities from regulation 
under §§ 404, 301(a), and 402, Civiletti could have easily read the 
statute to ensure EPA’s broad authority over the permitting of 
direct discharges of harmful substances generally, while 
 
54 Benjamin R. Civiletti, Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197 (1979).  
55 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10, at 709 n.85.  
56 Civiletti, supra note 54, at 201.  
57 Id. at 201–02.  




preserving the Corps’s more specific, narrowly focused § 404 
dredge and fill permitting authority. Such an interpretation 
would not necessarily have assured different agency regulatory 
outcomes as he hypothesized.58 
Civiletti’s interpretation of CWA legislative history 
arguably encouraged the EPA to revise its CWA § 404(b) 
guidelines at the close of the Carter administration. The 
guidelines intended to “[r]eflect the 1977 amendments of Section 
404 of the […] CWA,”59 with the EPA expanding the general 
“presumption against wetland alterations for nonwater 
dependent uses or where site or construction alternatives were 
available, […] to include ‘special aquatic sites’ such as important 
fish and wildlife habitats, marine sanctuaries, and refuges.” 
(emphasis added).60 The Guidelines were inconsistent with the 
language in § 404(c), as many commenters pointed out.61  
However, the EPA felt it was imperative dredge or fill 
material not be discharged into aquatic ecosystems, excluding 
discharges not having adverse impacts on the area.62 The EPA 
was also concerned with filling and dredging affecting the 
longevity of wetlands.63 Additionally, the EPA explained the 
Guidelines’ presumption relating to the water dependency 
provision presumed there were alternatives to “‘non-water 
dependent’ discharges” concerning special aquatic locations.64 
These “’non-water dependent’” discharges are those not needing 
to be close to or in the aquatic area to meet their end-use. 65 
 
58 Civiletti, supra note 54, at 202.  
59 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 
Fed. Reg. 85336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
60 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10, at 709.  
61 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 
Fed. Reg. 85336, 85339 (Dec. 24, 1980).  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.; see also 40 CFR 230.10(a) (1980) (“§ 230.10 […] (a) Except as provided under § 
404(b)(2), no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is a 
practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on 
the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse 
environmental consequences. (1) For the purpose of this requirement, practicable 
alternatives include, but are not limited to: (i) Activities which do not involve a discharge 
of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United States or ocean waters; (ii) 
Discharges of dredged or fill material at other locations in waters of the United States or 
ocean waters; (2) An alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being done 
after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall 
project purposes. (3) Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for 
a special aquatic site (as defined in Subpart E) [, including, § 230.41 Wetlands,] does not 
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 According to a former DOJ-ENRD attorney actively 
involved in CWA § 404 litigation during this period, the Reagan 
administration endeavored to soften the impact of these 
guidelines66 on the nation’s regulated farming communities, 
which the EPA and environmental activists then judicially 
challenged. For example, the Office of Management and Budget 
Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OMB-
OIRA”) attempted to have the EPA narrow the scope and 
prescriptiveness of the CWA § 404(b) guidelines.67 The Corps 
issued 1982 interim final regulations, the purposes of which were 
to expedite CWA § 404 permit processing “and expan[d] the 
nationwide permit program.”68 By requiring the Corps to balance 
multiple factors in the “public interest” when evaluating a CWA § 
404 permitting application, these regulations effectively reversed 
the burden of proof from the permit applicant to show in advance 
a proposed discharge of dredge and fill material meet the 
guidelines, to the agency to show the issuance of a permit was 
contrary to public interest.69 
Litigation over the conflicting EPA Guidelines and Corps 
interim final regulations ensued from 1982-1984. One of these 
cases, National Audubon Society v. Hartz Mountain Development 
Corp., formally recognized the 404(b) guidelines’ water 
dependency presumption as rebuttable, rejecting National 
Audubon’s argument that 100 percent mitigation of wetlands was 
 
require access or proximity to or siting within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill 
its basic purpose (i.e., is not ‘water dependent’), practicable alternatives that do not 
involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated 
otherwise. In addition, where a discharge is proposed for a special aquatic site, all 
practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge into a special aquatic site are presumed 
to have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, unless clearly demonstrated 
otherwise.”) (emphasis added). 
66 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 
Fed. Reg. 85336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (because the 404(b) Guidelines had been issued after 
extensive public notice and comment, the Carter administration had referred to them as a 
“rulemaking” with binding regulatory effect: “[t]hese Guidelines […] (3) Produce a final 
rulemaking document”); see also Corps RGL 93-02 (Aug. 23, 1993), at Sec. 2 (“The 
Guidelines, which are binding regulations, were published by the Environmental 
Protection Agency at 40 CFR Part 230 on December 24, 1980.”). 
67 Lawrence Liebesman, The Role of EPA’s Guidelines in the Clean Water Act § 
404 Permit Program — Judicial Interpretation and Administrative Application, 14 ENVTL. 
L. REV. 10272, 10275 (1984). 
68 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 31794 (July 22, 1982) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320–30).  
69 Id. at 320.4(a); Cf. 45 Fed. Reg. at 85345 (codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 230.1(c)). 




required.70 However, in National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, an 
action filed by an environmental activist group challenging the 
Corps 1982 interim regulations, the parties reached a settlement 
in February 1984 upholding the EPA’s 404(b) guidelines’ 
presumptions and required the revision of the 1982 Corps 
regulations.71 In Lawrence Liebesman’s opinion, “[t]he NWF 
settlement certainly did not alter this ‘balancing’ requirement nor 
did it transform the rebuttable presumption against discharge in 
wetlands to an irreversible presumption.”72 
These efforts by the Reagan administration triggered a 
request from U.S. Congressman James Oberstar to investigate 
and review the Corps’s administration of the CWA § 404 
permitting program.73 The GAO found normal farming and 
draining were not regulated activities under Section 404 and 
losses to wetlands based on these actions are not well tracked.74 
The GAO also found wetland boundaries were not defined broadly 
enough and the Corps was not reviewing permits practically or 
conceptually.75 
In referencing the normal farming activities, agricultural 
ditch construction, and maintenance activities, the 1977 CWA 
amendments authorized the Corps to treat them as exempt from 
CWA § 404 permitting.76 However, the GAO Report noted many 
such activities would have required a permit under the CWA § 
404(f)(2) recapture provision because they converted wetlands to 
other uses.77 EPA’s comments to this report are instructive of how 
the agency subsequently proceeded to aggressively employ both 
 
70 Nat. Audubon Soc’y v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., No. 83-1534D (D.N.J. Oct. 
24, 1983); see Liebesman, supra note 67, at 10277 (discusses several other cases in which 
permit applicant could not overcome the 404(b) guidelines’s presumption against wetland 
alterations for nonwatery dependent uses); see also Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 
1170 (5th Cir. 1982); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982); Shoreline 
Associates v. Marsh, 555 F. Supp. 169 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 677 (Table) (4th Cir. 
Jan. 10, 1984); Cf. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
71 Final Regulations for Controlling Certain Activities in Waters of the United 
States, 49 Fed. Reg. 39478 (Oct. 5, 1984) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320, 323, 325, and 
330); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Marsh, No. 82-3632 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1982).  
72 Liebesman supra note 67, at 10278.  
73 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of 
Representatives, Wetlands: The Corps of Engineers’ Administration of the Section 404 
Program, GAO/RCED-88–110 (July 1988), at 3, 6. 
74 Id. at 3. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 9.  
77 Id.  
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the CWA § 404(f)(2) recapture provision and the CWA § 404(b) 
guidelines to prevent wetland conversions by the nation’s small 
and medium-sized farming communities.78 
By this time, the Reagan administration had secured 
Congress’s enactment of the Food Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”)79 
to ameliorate the harsh impacts on private property rights that 
aggressive § 404 enforcement wrought upon the nation’s small 
and medium-sized farmers and ranchers. Through the FSA, 
Congress provided a prescribed doorway and protected window 
period within which farmers and ranchers could proceed, permit-
free, to change their land use from natural and cultivated 
wetland pasturing and haying to more productive cropping in 
furtherance of the nation’s efforts to promote agriculture, 
preserve wetlands, and reduce soil erosion. However, certain 
federal and state officials and conservationists did not believe the 
FSA sufficiently protected wetlands.  
As a result, an extensive political campaign and litigation 
ensued to interrupt prospective and already authorized farmer 
and rancher conversions of wetlands to croplands. Defendants’ 
previously filed FRCP 60(b) motion described in detail the 
extraordinary lengths to which federal and state agencies, led by 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”), along with 
federally funded environmental groups, inter alia, Ducks 
Unlimited, Inc. and the National Wildlife Federation, had gone to 
achieve such interruptions/disruptions.80  
 
II. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
PLAIN TEXTUAL MEANING ESPECIALLY IN CWA WETLANDS 
LITIGATION 
 
At least one commentator concluded, “[w]etlands 
[j]urisdiction [n]ever [s]hifted to the Clean Water Act in Congress 
as [c]laimed in [r]etroactive [a]nalysis of [c]ongressional [i]ntent,” 
because “Congress never intended to create a permanent federal 
wetlands permit program,” and “[w]ith the exception of the 
 
78 See id. at 102, 104. 
79 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).  
80 See Defendants’ Redrafted Mem. Of Law in Support of Redrafted 60(b)(5) 
Motion to Vacate Consent Decree and to Deny Stipulated Penalties at 37-51, Brace, No. 
1:90-cv-00229, ECF 279; see also Lawrence A. Kogan, Ducking the Truth About the Great 
‘Commenced Conversion’ Conspiracy Against America’s Farmers, 27 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. 
L. REV. 19, 30 (2017-2018). 




‘Swampbuster’ provision in the Food Security Act, Congress has 
never articulated the goal of wetlands protection.”81 Only the 
Wetlands Loan Extension Act of 197682 (the legislative history of 
which did “not mention the Clean Water Act or any goal or 
purpose for the protection of wetlands”) indirectly “address[ed] 
wetlands protection” by “provid[ing] funds for wetlands 
acquisition,” “increased appropriations, and “extend[ed time for] 
acquisitions for the 1961 Act until 1983” when the act expired.83 
The Senate Commerce Committee did not deem it “necessary to 
duplicate the purpose and goal in the Clean Water Act.”84 
Thus, even in the absence of any 1977 CWA § 404 
statutory text defining the terms “wetlands” or “converted 
wetlands,” and/or expressing Congress’s intent to subject the 
discharge of dredged or fill materials into non-tidal wetlands 
adjacent to manmade agricultural ditches to § 404 permitting,85 
the federal agencies (EPA, Corps, and USFWS) and the federal 
courts, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, improperly 
gleaned from selected extracts of unreliable legislative debates 
and committee reports the intent of select members of Congress 
to protect such wetlands. Neither the agencies and the appellate 
court in the initial Brace action, nor the district court in 
subsequent consent decree enforcement action, referenced the 
plain text of FSA §§ 1204 and 1222 or the subsequently issued 
1987 final FSA implementing regulations specifically discussing 
these terms in the context of agricultural activities, which would 
have provided a different result for the defendants in the Brace.  
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, because such 
“snippets” of legislative history were utilized “without regard to 
the context in which the remarks were made,” their use arguably 
resulted in erroneously overbroad interpretations of the 
 
81 Vickie V. Sutton, Wetlands Protection – A Goal Without a Statute, 7 S.C. 
ENVTL. L. J. 179, 186–189 (1998) (discussing the U.S. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1956, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and the Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1977); See also Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 
91 Stat. 1566 (1977).  
82 Wetlands Loan Extension Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-125, S. Rep. No. 94-594 
(1976). 
83 Sutton, supra note 81, at 186–87.  
84 Id. at 187.  
85 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Final 
Rules, 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (codified at 33 CFR 323.2(a)(3)) (July 19, 1977). 
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congressional intent underlying CWA § 404.86 Justice Scalia did 
not consider legislative history to be an acceptable tool in 
statutory interpretation.87 He reasoned, in part, that because 
legislative bodies are collectives, it is highly unlikely all of the 
legislators had the same understanding.88 In addition, he 
rationalized floor statements and committee reports are 
inherently unreliable sources of the full Congress’s intent and 
more prone to manipulation and distortion.89 Specifically, Justice 
Scalia wrote legislators were unlikely to focus on the specific 
issues appearing in litigation; they likely debated with varying 
opinions if they did discuss the issues.90 The unreliability of 
committee hearings and reports also indicate legislative history 
should not be relied upon.91  
Instead, Justice Scalia argued interpretation of a statute’s 
text “begins and ends with what the text says and fairly 
implies.”92 Therefore, interpretation is limited to principles based 
on language and historical meaning; legislative history is not 
included. In addition, “words must be given the meaning they had 
when the text was adopted.”93 Justice Scalia, furthermore, argued 
the use of legislative history diverts the focus from the statutory 
text to the intent of the legislature, and thereby, substantively 
creates a government of men and not of laws.94 He also 
emphasized the meaning of statutory terms should be based on 
the meaning shown to be most in accord with context and 
ordinary usage and most compatible with the surrounding body of 
law.95 Significantly, Justice Scalia argued, “the legislative history 
was never enacted and is therefore not the law.”96 Even Professor 
 
86 Elizabeth Liess, Censoring Legislative History: Scalia on the Use of 
Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 568, 574 (1993).  
87 See generally id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 376 (2012).  
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 16. 
93 Id. at 78. 
94 See id. at 375. 
95 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J. 
concurring). 
96 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103. HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 430 (1989) (citing Scalia’s concurring opinions in Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–373 
(1989); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989).  




Cass Sunstein, an advocate of “living constitutionalism”97 who 
views original public meaning as a formal nonmandatory 
approach to statutory interpretation,98 acknowledged the 
legitimacy of Scalia’s concerns.99  
Previously, courts understood legislative history as a way 
to manipulate a law’s meaning and as a source from which to 
infer answers to hypothetically posed questions that suit a court’s 
intent.100 Most succinctly, the court in In re Sinclair, wrote 
“statutes are law, not evidence of law.”101 Similarly, in Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the U.S. Supreme Court employed the plain meaning 
approach to interpreting the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 404 to 
avoid conflict with the Commerce Clause and traditional notions 
 
97See Andrew Coan, Living Constitutional Theory, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 99, 105 
(referring to Cass Sunstein as an advocate of “an affirmative vision of American 
constitutionalism that could be invoked to support and expand on the Warren Court’s 
constitutional decisions. The work of these theorists, notably including Frank Michelman 
and Cass Sunstein, is too rich and varied to be neatly summarized here. But their central 
argument is that the American constitutional tradition is not merely, perhaps not even 
predominantly, one of liberal individualism.”); see also, David A. Strauss, The Living 
Constitution, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 27, 2010), 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution [https://perma.cc/39ZD-P5A7].  
98 See Cass Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1697–98 
(2018). 
99 See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405, 430 (1989) (Professor Cass Sunstein previously acknowledged that, “judicial 
reliance on legislative intent, whether or not derived on the basis of legislative history, 
suffers from three basic difficulties” which led him to conclude that “the notion of 
legislative intent is at best an incomplete guide to statutory construction”); Id., at 431–
434; see also id. at 468, 474–475 (discussing “a Cautious Approach to Legislative History 
as a rule of priority for interpreting regulatory statutes. “As Justice Scalia has 
emphasized, legislative history is sometimes written by one side or another in a dispute 
over the content of the law, and the history will sometimes reflect a view that could not 
prevail in the processes of congressional deliberation. (“In any case, the history is not law. 
Courts should therefore adopt a firm principle of the priority of statutory text to statutory 
history – a principle that does not call on courts entirely do disregard history, but that 
gives the history limited weight in cases of conflict.”).  
100 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989). 
101 Id. at 1343; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (1899) (“[…] 
[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively according to the laws of language. 
Thereupon we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the 
mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they 
were used...But the normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a literary form, 
so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is external to the particular writer, and 
a reference to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of the 
law...We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute 
means.”); (“Or as Judge Friendly put things in a variation on Holmes's theme, a court 
must search for "what Congress meant by what it said, rather than for what it meant 
simpliciter.") 
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of federalism.102 The Court held, “[w]here an administrative 
interpretation of statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ 
power, we expect a clear indication Congress intended such 
result.”103  
The Court further held “[t]his concern is heightened where 
the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state 
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a 
traditional state power.”104 “Thus, ‘where an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problem unless construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.’”105 In effect, the Court in Solid Waste Industry 
restricted the scope of the Corps’s permitting jurisdiction under 
CWA § 404 by interpreting the statutory term “navigable waters” 
so as not to cover small intrastate ponds and intermittent 
streams which do not engender interstate commerce.106  
The Supreme Court arguably rejected the Court’s prior 
deference to agency interpretations of a statute under Chevron 
where the agency’s interpretation of § 404(a) would be 
unreasonable or result in infringement of a traditional state 
power – protection of the environment – through state and local 
control of water and land use (i.e., out of federalism concerns).107 
The Court in Solid Waste Industry recognized the CWA’s limited 
application to only tidal wetlands adjacent to traditional 
navigable waters.108  
Furthermore, a Supreme Court plurality in Rapanos v. 
United States employed the plain meaning approach to 
interpreting statutes to effectively reject Chevron deference to a 
longstanding Corps interpretation of CWA§ 404.109 In particular, 
the Court’s plurality had dispensed with the Corps’s 
 
102 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
170–81 (2001). 
103 Id. at 172 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).  
104 Id. at 173 (citing See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)) (“[U]nless 
Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed 
the federal-state balance.”). 
105 Id. at 173 (quoting DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575). 
106 Id.  
107 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
108 Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 159. 
109 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006). 




interpretation of the term “waters” as including “wetlands,”110 
intermittent water bodies, (i.e., arroyos) and man-made 
channels.111 Rather, the court decided on a narrower 
interpretation limiting “waters” to relatively permanent oceans, 
rivers, streams and lakes.112 The Rapanos decision also 
recognized the CWA’s limited application to only tidal wetlands 
adjacent to traditional navigable waters.113  
The Supreme Court recalled its prior holding in Iselin v. 
United States, where the Court refused to extend the coverage of 
a statute covering one subject matter but expressly failing to 
 
110 Regulatory Guidance Letter, USACE (Aug. 27, 1986), 
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll9/id/1331 
[https://perma.cc/Q3V2-N87B] (The Corps defines the term “wetland” as including 
“swamps,” “bogs” and marshes,” which it describes as “truly aquatic areas.”); Swamp, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/swamp [https://perma.cc/HKZ6-YQQA] (last viewed Nov. 25, 2020) 
(However, the plain meaning of the term “swamp” is “a wetland often partially or 
intermittently covered with water.”); Marsh, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/marsh [https://perma.cc/B3UX-PPGQ] (last 
viewed Nov. 25, 2020) (The plain meaning of the term “marsh” is “a tract of soft wet land 
usually characterized by monocotyledons (such as grasses or cattails)”); Bog, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bog 
[https://perma.cc/3SS8-JEQ9] (last viewed Nov. 25, 2020) (The plain meaning of the term 
“bog” is “a poorly drained usually acid area rich in accumulated plant material, frequently 
surrounding a body of open water, and having a characteristic flora (as of sedges, heats 
and sphagnum)”). 
111 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725. 
112 Id. at 731–33 (“We need not decide the precise extent to which the qualifiers 
‘navigable’ and ‘of the United States’ restrict the coverage of the Act. Whatever the scope 
of these qualifiers, the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over ‘waters.’ [citations 
omitted] The only natural definition of the term ‘waters,’ our prior and subsequent judicial 
constructions of it, clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court's 
canons of construction all confirm that ‘the waters of the United States’ in § 1362(7) 
cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps would give it. The Corps' expansive 
approach might be arguable if the CWA defined ‘navigable waters’ as ‘water of the United 
States.’ But ‘the waters of the United States’ is something else. The use of the definite 
article (‘the’) and the plural number (‘waters’) shows plainly that § 1362(7) does not refer 
to water in general. In this form, ‘the waters’ refers more narrowly to water ‘[a]s found in 
streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or 
‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies.’ 
Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster's Second) 
[footnotes omitted]. On this definition, ‘the waters of the United States’ include only 
relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water. The definition refers to water 
as found in ‘streams,’ ‘oceans,’ ‘rivers,’ ‘lakes,’ and ‘bodies’ of water ‘forming geographical 
features.’ Ibid. All of these terms connote continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as 
opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally or intermittently 
flows. Even the least substantial of the definition's terms, namely ‘streams,’ connotes a 
continuous flow of water in a permanent channel — especially when used in company with 
other terms such as ‘rivers,’ ‘lakes,’ and ‘oceans.’”). 
113 Id. 
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include another subject matter.114 More recently, in Lamie v. 
United States Trustee, the Court was more explicit.115 It held 
courts should not add an “absent word” to a statute.116 According 
to the Lamie Court, reading an “absent word into the statute,” as 
the petitioner wanted, would enlarge the meaning of a statute 
beyond its enacted scope to effectively rewrite it.117 In Lamie, the 
Court was unwilling to do so, citing deference to the Legislature 
and recognition of constitutional powers.118 The Court’s ruling in 
Lamie arguably addressed Congress’s failure to define the terms 
“wetlands” or “converted wetlands” anywhere within the text of 
the CWA, especially in § 404, whereas Congress expressly defined 
these terms within the text of the Food Security Act of 1985 
(“FSA”). 
In reading the law as Congress had written it (i.e., as it 
appears in the statute), therefore, the District Court in Brace 
should carefully consider: “Statutory language ‘cannot be 
construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.’”119 With such understanding, the District Court should 
heed the Supreme Court’s admonition that an agency action 
interpreting a statute affecting the rights of private parties must 
be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Pursuant to 
this standard, the Court should determine whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of all the relevant factors the 
statute set forth to guide the agency in the exercise of its 
discretion, and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment.120 Significantly, the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“USFWS”) in Weyerhauser did not cite Chevron in its 
brief to justify the agency’s interpretation of the Endangered 
Species Act provision in question.121  
 
114 Iselin v. U.S., 270 U.S. 245, 250 (1926) (The Court refused to extend coverage where 
Congress subjected specific categories of ticket sales to taxation but failed to cover another 
category, either by specific or by general language). 




119 Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016). 
120 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 
(2018). 
121 Lisa Heinzerling, Opinion Analysis: Frogs and Humans Live to Fight Another 
Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/opinion-analysis-
frogs-and-humans-live-to-fight-another-day/ [https://perma.cc/9TUE-YNGE]; Lisa 




Apparently, the Government sought to avoid providing the 
Supreme Court with the opportunity to overrule Chevron, in light 
of the strongly worded concurring opinions of Justices Alito, 
Scalia, and Thomas in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, which 
suggested it was time for the Court to revisit Chevron 
precedents.122 In Perez, for example, Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence emphasized how such deference tends to give effect 
to the interpretation rather than the regulations themselves, and 
consequently, to facilitating an unconstitutional transfer of 
judicial power (i.e., a transfer of the judge’s exercise of 
interpretive judgment) to an executive agency and “an erosion of 
the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political 
branches.”123 
 
Heinzerling, Argument Preview: Justices to Consider Critical-habitat Designation for 
Endangered Frog, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/09/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-critical-
habitat-designation-for-endangered-frog/ [https://perma.cc/4RWR-4RSP].  
122 Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgement) (referring to how the Paralyzed 
Veterans of America doctrine “may have been prompted by an understandable concern 
about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies as a result of the 
combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Congress of huge swaths of 
lawmaking authority, (2) the exploitation by agencies of the uncertain boundary between 
legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s cases holding that courts must 
ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.” (citations 
omitted); see id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgement) (“The [APA] was framed 
against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a check upon 
administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not 
contemplated in legislation creating their offices.’[citations omitted]. The Act guards 
against excesses in rulemaking by requiring notice and comment. Before an agency makes 
a rule, it normally must notify the public of the proposal, invite them to comment on its 
shortcomings, consider and respond to their arguments, and explain its final decision in a 
statement of the rule’s basis and purpose. [citations omitted] […] The APA exempts 
interpretive rules from these requirements. §553(b)(A). But this concession to agencies 
was meant to be more modest in its effects than it is today. For despite exempting 
interpretive rules from notice and comment, the Act provides that ‘the reviewing court 
shall…interpret constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.’ [citations omitted]. The Act thus 
contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes 
and regulations.”); see id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I write 
separately because these cases call into question the legitimacy of our precedents 
requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations. That line of 
precedents, beginning with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410 (1945), 
requires judges to defer to agency interpretations of regulations, thus, as happened in 
these cases, giving legal effect to the interpretations rather than the regulations 
themselves. Because this doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive 
agency, it raises constitutional concerns. This line of precedents undermines our 
obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated 
parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”).  
123 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
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Interpreting agency regulations calls for that 
exercise of independent judgment. Substantive 
regulations have the force and effect of law. 
Agencies and private parties alike can use these 
regulations in proceedings against regulated 
parties. Just as it is critical for judges to exercise 
independent judgment in applying statutes, it is 
critical for judges to exercise independent judgment 
in determining that a regulation properly covers 
the conduct of regulated parties. Defining the legal 
meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that 
determination.124 
 
The Thomas concurrence emphasized how, over time, such 
deference resulted in “allow[ing] agencies to change the meaning 
of regulations at their discretion and without any advance notice 
to the parties.”125 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit sought to address this problem by “requiring agencies to 
undertake notice and comment procedures before substantially 
revising definitive interpretations of regulations.”126 
One legal commentator argued Chevron was not decided 
based either on statute or precedent, but rather on “‘institutional 
considerations’ typical of the ‘legal process’ school of 
interpretation then dominant in the legal academy, which 
emphasized agency expertise . . . [and] democratic 
accountability.”127 According to the same commentator,  
 
[B]oth of those grounds now seem shaky. The idea 
that most decisions by regulatory agencies are 
based on non-political expert judgment now 
appears naïve. The most important regulatory 
choices are political or ideological in the most 
fundamental sense, as prioritizing one or another 
 
124 Id. at 1219 (internal citations omitted); See also id. at n.4 (discussing how 
agency use of regulations has approached the unconstitutional exercise of legislative 
power). 
125 Id. at 1221 (citing Paralyzed Veterans of America, v. D.C Arena L.P., 117 
F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir.). 
126 Id.  
127 Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh and the ‘Chevron Doctrine,’ HOOVER 
INSTITUTE (July 30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-
doctrine [https://perma.cc/5VY8-NTHF]. 




aspect of the public good, or one or another theory 
of economics or social justice.128 
 
The Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, arguably narrowed 
the scope of its prior Chevron decision.129  
In PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, 
Inc., the Court held that the extent to which a final agency action 
warrants deference from federal courts depends on whether the 
final agency action is “the equivalent or a ‘legislative rule’” or “an 
‘interpretative’ rule;’” only the former has the force and effect of 
law.130 Consequently, an interpretative rule “may not be binding 
on a district court, and a district court therefore may not be 
required to adhere to it.”131 In addition, the Court held that it 
must be determined whether the litigant “has a ‘prior’ and 
‘adequate’ opportunity to seek judicial review of the Order” 
within the statutory scheme in question.132 Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch further emphasized in their concurring opinion that an 
agency’s “interpretati[on of] a statute does not ‘determine the 
validity’ of an agency order interpreting or implementing the 
statute” because only the court possesses the (Article III) 
authority to make such a determination.133 
In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court set forth a roadmap 
arguably cabining the scope of deference that the Court’s prior 
ruling in Auer v. Robbins had accorded to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.134 The Court, in 
Kisor held “[f]irst and foremost,” that an agency’s interpretation 
 
128 Id. 
129 See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 
2051, 2053 (2019) (focusing on whether the Hobbs Act required the district court to accept 
the FCC’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act); Kisor v. Wilkie, 
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (focusing specifically on whether courts should defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations and guidance 
documents).  
130 PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2055 (distinguishing between “legislative rule[s]” 
“issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority” which have “the ‘force and effect of 
law’” and “‘interpretative rule[s]’ which “simply ‘advis[es] the public of the agency’s 
construction of the statutes and rules which [they] administer[]’ and lack[] ‘the force and 
effect of law.’”).  
131 Id. 
132 Id (citing 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2012)). 
133 Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As I have explained elsewhere, ‘the 
judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent 
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’”).  
134 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (explaining that Auer 
deference often does not apply).  
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of its own ambiguous rules does not deserve deference “unless the 
[agency] regulation is genuinely ambiguous.”135 The 
determination of whether a regulation is ambiguous requires the 
exhaustion of “all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”136 In 
other words, it entails a thorough review of “the text, structure, 
history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it 
had no agency to fall back on.”137 Even where a district 
determines that an agency regulation is genuinely ambiguous, 
“the agency’s reading must still be ‘reasonable.’”138  
Additionally, the district court “must make an 
independent inquiry into whether the character and context of 
the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight,”139 
which will depend on whether the agency’s regulatory 
interpretation represents an “‘authoritative’ or ‘official position’” 
rather than an “ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s 
views.”140 According to the Court, only an “official position” will be 
entitled to controlling weight, and thus, judicial deference.141 The 
Court, furthermore, held that “the agency’s interpretation must 
in some way implicate its substantive [or policy] expertise” 
relative to the court’s expertise in a given issue.142 Finally, the 
Court held that to warrant Auer deference “an agency’s reading 
of a rule must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment,’” rather than 
a convenient agency litigation position or a defense of a past 
agency practice, and must not “create[] ‘unfair surprise’ to 
regulated parties.”143 This means, for all intents and purposes, 
that “[a] court must assess whether the interpretation is of the 
sort that Congress would want to receive deference.”144 
In reading the law as Congress had written it, the District 
Court should heed the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior ruling in 
 
135 Id. at 2415. (holding that, under Auer and Boles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), “[i]f uncertainty does not exist, there is no plausible reason for 
deference.”). 
136 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).  
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 2416. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. (explaining that an ‘official position’ is one that emanates from the 
agency’s highest/head official (e.g., “the Secretary or his chief advisers”), is “’published in 
the Federal Register,’” is “approved by the agency head,” and/or is “understood to make 
authoritative policy in the relevant context.”). 
142 Id. at 2417. 
143 Id. at 2417-18. 
144 Id. at 2424. 




United States v. Estate of Romani, which held, where two 
statutes supposedly covering a given subject matter are in 
conflict, “the more recent and specific provisions of” the later 
statute govern.145 The question presented in Estate of Romani 
was whether the Federal Priority Statute required “that a federal 
tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor’s perfected 
lien on real property even though such a preference is not 
authorized by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.146 The Court 
sought to “harmonize the impact of the two statutes on the 
Government’s power to collect delinquent taxes,” noting how “[o]n 
several occasions this Court ha[d] concluded that a specific policy 
embodied in a later federal statute should control interpretation 
of the older federal priority statute” despite explicit amendment 
by later act.”147 In holding the Tax Lien Act of 1966 should be 
treated as the governing statute, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reasoned it was  
 
[T]he more specific statute, […] its provisions are 
comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt to 
accommodate the strong policy objections to the 
enforcement of secret liens[,…and i]t represents 
Congress’ detailed judgment as to when the 
Government’s claims for unpaid taxes should yield 
to many different sorts of interests (including, for 
instance, judgment liens, mechanics liens, and 
attorney’s liens) in many different types of property 
(including, for example, real property, securities, 
and motor vehicles).148 
 
Given these characteristics of the more recent statute, the Court 
determined “it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress 
intended the priority statute to impose greater burdens on the 
citizen than those specifically crafted for tax collection 
purposes.”149  
Clearly, the Food Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”) is the more 
recent of the two federal statutes. Unlike the CWA, the FSA 
 
145 United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998). 
146 Id. at 519; 31 U. S. C. § 3713(a) (1982). 
147 Romani, 523 U.S. at 530. 
148 Id. at 532. 
149 Id. 
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includes specific provisions to address how wetlands and 
converted wetlands present on farmlands are to be treated as a 
matter of wetland conservation within “Title XII – 
Conservation.”150 Congress dedicated two Subtitles under Title 
XII in the FSA to this effort: one defines the terms “wetland” and 
“converted wetland,” while the other focuses specifically on 
identifying preferable treatment for conversions of non-tidal 
pastured and hayed wetlands to croplands.151 As the Supreme 
Court concluded in Romani, in seeking to harmonize the impact 
of the CWA and FSA in Brace and similar cases, , federal courts 
should find it anomalous to conclude that Congress intended the 
general “dredge” and “fill” provisions of CWA § 404 to impose 
greater burdens on citizen farmers like Mr. Brace, than those 




150 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L No. 99–198 (HR 2100), 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). 
151 Id. 
152 Romani, 523 U.S. at 532. 




III. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD UNDERSTAND HOW FEDERAL 
AGENCIES & COURTS PRIMARILY INFERRED CWA § 404 COVERAGE 
OF NON-TIDAL WETLANDS ADJACENT TO MANMADE DITCHES AND 
‘CONVERTED WETLANDS’ FROM UNRELIABLE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 
 
A. Applicable 1977 Clean Water Act “(CWA”) Statutory Text Not 
Addressing Wetlands or ‘Converted Wetlands’ 
 
The applicable 1977 amendments to CWA § 404 were 
enacted on December 27, 1977.153 The statutory language of CWA 
§ 404 does not define the terms “wetland” or “converted wetland,” 
nor does it express congressional intent that discharges of dredge 
and fill material into non-tidal wetlands adjacent to manmade 
agricultural ditches should be included within the definition of 
“waters of the United States,” and consequently, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the CWA § 404 permitting regime. The absence of 
these definitions from the statutory text should have informed 
federal courts’s interpretation of the § 404(f)(1)(A) and (C) 
exemptions, respectively, to “normal farming and ranching 
activities” and to irrigation ditch construction and drainage ditch 
maintenance activities.  
Section 404(a) vests the Secretary of the Army, acting 
through the Chief of Engineers, with the authority to issue 
permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”154 Pursuant to § 
404(b), the Secretary of the Army possesses the authority to 
develop guidelines, in conjunction with the Administrator of the 
EPA, prohibiting the specification of a site.155 Under § 404(c) the 
Administrator of the EPA can “prohibit the specification 
(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as 
a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of 
any defined area for specification as a disposal site.156  
CWA § 404(f)(1)(A) exempts from § 404 general permitting 
the discharge of dredge or fill material from established farming 
and ranching activities, including plowing, seeding, cultivating, 
 
153 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 99 Stat. 1600 (1977). 
154 CWA § 404(a). 
155 CWA § 404(b). 
156 CWA § 404(c). 
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and harvesting.157 CWA § 404(f)(1)(C) exempts from general § 404 
permitting discharges of dredge or fill material due to the 
construction and maintenance of drainage ditches.158 The 
recapture provision (CWA § 404(f)(2)) applies despite the 
availability of either such exemption. It states that even 
incidental discharge of dredge or fill material will need a § 404 
permit, if it changes the use of a wetland area by reducing the 
reach or impairing the flow or circulation of waters of the United 
States.159 CWA § 404(g)(1) affords each state governor the 
opportunity “to administer its own individual and general permit 
program” for discharges “of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters (other than those waters” currently used or 
susceptible to use for interstate commerce, and tidal waters, 
“including wetlands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction.” 160  
 
B. Agencies Regulations, Guidelines and Policy Statements 
Claiming ‘Broad’ CWA § 404 Jurisdiction to Cover Wetlands 
Adjacent to Manmade Agricultural Ditches and ‘Converted 
Wetlands’ 
 
Numerous and frequently changing EPA and Corps 
regulations, guidelines and policy statements have been 
promulgated to implement the broad CWA § 404 jurisdiction that 
federal courts had inferred from legislative history.161 
  
1. 1973 EPA Policy Statement 
 
The first EPA policy statement on protecting wetlands was 
issued via federal register, but it did not address “converted 
wetlands.”162 However, since the EPA, before issuing this policy 
statement, had failed to follow public notice and comment 
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, the statement 
could not be considered a binding legislative rule upon EPA or 
the public.163  
 
157 §1344(f)(1)(A). 
158§1344 (f)(1)(C).  
159 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.S. §1344(f)(2) 
160 CWA § 404(g)(1).  
161 CWA § 404(a). 
162 See Environmental Protection Agency; Protection of Nation’s Wetlands Policy 
Statement, 38 Fed. Reg. 10834-35 (May 2, 1973). 
163 See Recommendation 92-2, Administrative Conference of the United States 
(Jun. 18, 1992), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/92-2.pdf 





2. 1975 Corps Interim Final Regulations 
 
Interim Corps regulations issued in 1975 defined 
“navigable waters of the United States” to cover “[f]reshwater 
wetlands including marshes, shallows, swamps, and similar 
areas that are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters 
and that support freshwater vegetation.”164 They did not 
expressly cover nontidal freshwater wetlands adjacent to 
tributaries of U.S. navigable waters.165  
 
3. The 1977 Corps Final Regulations 
 
The final 1977 Corps regulations explicitly excluded from 
the coverage of “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”) nontidal 
wetlands adjacent to tributaries to U.S. navigable waters, where 
said “tributaries” actually were “nontidal drainage and irrigation 
ditches excavated on dry land.” (emphasis added).166 In this 
context, “dry land” meant land other than “wetlands,” which had 
been redefined as “[t]hose areas that are inundated or saturated 
by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient 
to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a 
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated 
soil conditions.”167 The preamble to these regulations clarified the 
agency had not intended “to assert jurisdiction over those areas 
 
[https://perma.cc/4TNH-9A32] (“Where the policy statement is treated by the agency as 
binding, it operates effectively as a legislative rule but without the notice-and-comment 
protection of section 553. It may be difficult or impossible for affected persons to challenge 
the policy statement within the agency’s own decisional process; they may be foreclosed 
from an opportunity to contend the policy statement is unlawful or unwise, or that an 
alternative policy should be adopted. […] The Conference believes this outcome should be 
avoided, first by requiring that when an agency contemplates an announcement of 
substantive policy (other than through an adjudicative decision), it should decide whether 
to issue the policy as a legislative rule, in a form that binds affected persons, or as a 
nonbinding policy statement. Second, to prevent policy statements from being treated as 
binding as a practical matter, the recommendation suggests agencies establish informal 
and flexible procedures that allow an opportunity to challenge policy statements. […] 
Recommendations […] II. Policy Statements A. Notice of nonbinding nature. Policy 
statements of general applicability should make clear they are not binding.”).  
164 Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army; Permits for Activities in 
Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31324(9)(h) (Jul. 25, 1975) (codified at 33 
C.F.R. Pt. 209). 
165 Id. 
166 Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army; Regulatory Programs of the 
Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (July 19, 1977) (codified at 33 CFR pt. 323). 
167 Id. at 31728 (emphasis added). 
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that once were wetlands and part of an aquatic system, but 
which, in the past, have been transformed into dry land for 
various purposes.”168 This provision appeared to serve more as a 
“grandfather” provision addressing already converted wetlands 
rather than as a provision concerned with the contemporary 
treatment of wetlands in the process of conversion. 
 
4. 1979 and 1980 EPA Detailed 404(b)(1) Guidance 
 
The first detailed EPA rules interpreting § 404 
amendments in the context of discharges of dredged or fill 
materials were issued in 1979 and 1980, respectively. They were 
released initially in the form of a proposed regulation, and then 
in the form of “final guidelines,” both of which the EPA argued 
had “regulatory effect.”169 The proposed regulations defined the 
term “navigable waters” as “…waters of the United States,” while 
the final guidelines defined “waters of the United States” as 
including: (1) “[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used 
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide;” (3) “…intrastate […] rivers, streams (including 
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, and wetlands; the 
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or 
foreign commerce including any such waters;” and “(7) wetlands 
adjacent to waters identified [above].”170  
The 1979 proposed regulations and the 1980 EPA final 
guidelines defined the term “wetlands” as locations “inundated or 
saturated by surface or ground water” that support flora and 
fauna known to thrive in such conditions.171 This includes but is 
not limited swamps, marshes, and bogs.172 These rules defined 
the term “adjacent” as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.”173 
The 1980 EPA Final 404(b)(1) Guidelines did not address the 
treatment of “converted wetlands,” except to exclude it from the 
 
168 Id.  
169 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged Material, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 54222 (Sept. 18, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230); Guidelines for Specification of 
Disposal Sites for Dredged Material, 45 Fed. Reg. 85336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 230). 
170 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336. 
171 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336. 
172 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336. 
173 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336. 




definition of “waters of the United States,” and thus, from EPA 
jurisdiction.174 
 
5. 1982 Corps Interim Final Regulations 
 
The first Corps regulation addressing these terms was 
issued in 1982.175 The Corps defined the term “navigable waters 
of the United States,” which framed the scope of its authorities to 
issue permits under the Clean Water Act, as being potentially 
narrower than the term “waters of the United States.”176 The 
1982 interim final Corps regulations set forth a general definition 
of “navigable waters of the United States,” that did “not apply to 
authorities under the Clean Water Act which definitions are 
described under 33 CFR Part 323.”177 The 1982 regulations 
defined “navigable waters of the United States” as “those waters 
that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are 
presently used, or have been used in in the past, or may be 
susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign 
commerce.”178 
The 1982 Corps interim final regulations addressed the 
term “converted wetlands” in the context of the “normal farming 
activities” exemption.179 These regulations stated for farming 
activities to qualify for such exemption, they should make up an 
on-going established farming operation,180 which can include 
fields lying fallow as part of practiced conventional crop rotation 
techniques.181 The 1982 regulations did not consider either 
conversion “activities which bring an area into farming,” or lands 
remaining idle for so long that they require modifications to the 
hydrological regime to resume operations, as part of already 
established farming operation.182 These regulations also 
 
174 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336. 
175 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 
Fed. Reg. 31794, 31811 (Jul. 22, 1982) (to be codified at 33 CFR § 323.2(c)-(d)).  
176 Id. at 31829 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.4).  
177 Id. (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.1).  
178 Id. (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.4).  
179 Id. at 31812 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 323.4(a)(1)(i)).  
180 Id. 
181 Id. (to be codified at 33 CFR § 323.4(a)(1)(ii)). 
182 Id. 
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implemented the CWA § 404(f)(2) recapture provision, as 
described in Section III.A above.183 
 
6. 1984 Corps Final Regulations 
 
The 1984 Corps final regulations adopted these definitions 
with minor, if any, changes. One of these changes denied the 
Nationwide Permit (“NWP”) 26 exemption from CWA § 404 
individual permitting otherwise available to discharges of dredge 
or fill material into one to ten acres of nontidal streams and 
rivers, including adjacent wetlands located above the headwaters 
of the WOTUS, if the discharges result in a “substantial adverse 
modification” to said waters.184 The NWP 26 exemption will be 
denied even though the activity did not convert the WOTUS to 
dry land (i.e., cause a “loss” of the WOTUS).185 The Corps 
apparently imposed this new recapture trigger to narrow the 
availability of this nationwide permit under CWA § 404(e)(1). 
“Generally, a substantial adverse modification occurs when a 
discharge eliminates the principal valuable functions of a water 
of the United States (including wetlands) even though the 
discharge does not convert the water to dry land.”186  
 
7. 1986 Corps Final Regulations 
 
Only in the final regulations promulgated in 1986 did the 
Corps define “waters of the United States” as broadly as did 
EPA’s 1980 final 404(b)(1) guidelines. The 1986 final regulations 
provide the prior definition of navigable waters did “not apply to 
authorities under the Clean Water Act which definitions are 
described under 33 CFR Parts 323 and 328.”187 The 1986 Corps 
regulations defined “waters of the United States” identically to 
 
183 Id. at 31813 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R § 323.4(c)) (emphasis added) 
(describing the recapture provision as being triggered when the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into a WOTUS “is part of an activity whose purpose is to convert an area of the 
waters of the United States into a use to which it was not previously subject and the flow 
for circulation of waters of the United States may be impaired or the reach of such waters 
reduced.”). 
184 Final Regulations for Controlling Certain Activities in Waters of the United 
States, 49 Fed. Reg. 39478, 39480 (Oct. 5, 1984) (to be codified at 33 CFR § 330.5(a)(26)). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. (emphasis added). 
187 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 
41206, 41251 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.1 (emphasis added). 




the 1980 EPA regulations.188 The regulations also define the 
terms “wetlands” and “adjacent”189 identically to § 404(b) 
guidelines.190 The “normal farming activities” exemption and 
recapture provisions contained within the 1982 regulations were 
later incorporated within the 1986 revisions to said 
regulations.191 The 1986 regulations contained one new addition, 
which states “conversion of a wetland to a non-wetland is a 
change in use of an area of waters of the United States.” 
(emphasis added).192 
 
8. 1986 Corps Guidance – RGL 86-09 – ‘Normal 
Circumstances’ of ‘Converted Wetlands 
 
Corps Regulatory Guidance Letter (“RGL”) 86-09 
discussed the effect a conversion of a wetland to other uses would 
have upon federal jurisdiction.193 The letter stated the Corps had 
“listed swamps, bogs, and marshes at the end of the definition at 
323.2(c) to further clarify [the agency’s] intent to include only 
truly aquatic areas” within the definition of “wetlands.”194 Corps 
RGL 86-09 emphasized “the phrase ‘under normal 
circumstances’” in the definition of “wetlands” was intended for 
“areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal presence 
of aquatic vegetation.”195 The abnormal presence of aquatic 
vegetation in a non-aquatic area would not be sufficient to 
include that area within the Section 404 program.196  
 
188 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 
Fed. Reg. 85336, 85346 (Dec. 24, 1980) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 230.3(s)); Final Rule for 
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41250 (Nov. 13, 1986) 
(to be codified at 33 CFR § 328.3(a)).  
189 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 
41251 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 328.3(b)-(c)). 
190 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 
Fed. Reg. at 85345 (to be codified at 40 CFR § 230.3(t)). 
191 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 
41233, 41234 (to be codified as 33 CFR § 323.4(a)(1)(i), 323.4(c)). 
192Compare Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of 
Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31812, with Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of 
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41325. 
193 See Clarification of “Normal Circumstances” in the Wetland Definition, Corps 
RGL 86-09, para. 3 (Aug. 27, 1986). 
194 Id. (emphasis added). 
195 Id. 
196 See id. at para. 4 (“The use of the phrase ‘normal circumstances’ is meant to 
respond to those situations in which an individual would attempt to eliminate the permit 
review requirements of Section 404 by destroying the aquatic vegetation, and to those 
areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation. 
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The guidance letter distinguished ‘natural circumstances’ 
(i.e., where previously converted wetlands left unattended for a 
sufficient period of time “would revert to wetlands solely through 
the devices of nature) from ‘normal circumstances.’”197 These are 
based on the specific locations characteristics, its use and its 
history. If the wetland is altered to the point it no longer falls 
under WOTUS, then the land is not under Corps jurisdiction, 
unless these characteristics are restored.198 
 
9. 1988 EPA Final Regulations 
 
 The EPA’s 1988 final regulations set forth the procedures 
states and EPA must follow to apply for and review applications 
to administer the § 404 program.199 These regulations define the 
terms “waters of the United States,” and “wetlands.”200 They also 
provide the criteria required to establish eligibility for 
exemptions under “normal farming activities”201 or the 
construction of irrigation ditches or the maintenance of drainage 
ditches.202  
To qualify for the “normal farming activities exemption, 
the specified activities must be part of an “establish[ed] (i.e., 
ongoing) farming or ranching operation” and comply with later 
definitions.”203 Activities bringing an area into farming or 
ranching are not part of an established operation.204 An operation 
ceases to be established (i.e., it is effectively “abandoned”) “when 
the area in which it was conducted has been converted to another 
use, or [it] has lain idle so long that modifications to the 
hydrological regime are necessary to resume operations.”205 If an 
 
Several instances of aquatic vegetation to eliminate Section 404 jurisdiction have actually 
occurred. Because those areas would still support aquatic vegetation ‘under normal 
circumstances,’ they remain a part of the overall aquatic system intended to be protected 
by the Section 404 program; therefore, jurisdiction still exists.”). 
197 Id. at para. 5. 
198 Id. 
199 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions; 
Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20764, 20776-20787 (June 6, 1988) 
(to be codified at 40 CFR §§ 233.1-233.53). 
200 Id. at 20774 (to be codified at 40 CFR § 232.2(q), 232.2(r)).  
201 Id. at 20775 (to be codified at 40 CFR § 232.3(c)(1)(i)-(ii)). 
202 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions, 53 








activity does not occur within waters of the United States or does 
not include a discharge, then a § 404 permit is not needed, even if 
it is not part of an established agriculture operation.206 These 
criteria are identical to those previously set forth in the 1982 
Corps interim regulations.207  
The regulations define “cultivating” as a physical way to 
treat soil so farming and ranching operations may improve their 
yield or quality of the products.208 Harvesting is defined as 
physical measures employed directly upon farm or ranch crops 
within established agricultural lands to bring about their 
removal from farm and ranch.209 In addition, the regulations 
define “minor drainage” as the  
 
(A) The discharge of dredged or fill material 
incidental to connecting upland drainage facilities 
to waters of the United States, adequate to effect 
the removal of excess soil moisture from upland 
croplands. Construction and maintenance of upland 
(dryland) facilities such as ditching and tiling, 
incidental to the planting, cultivating, protecting or 
harvesting crops, involve no discharge of dredged 
or fill material into waters of the United States, 
and as such, never require a Section 404 permit. 
(B) The discharge of dredged or fill material for the 
purpose of installing ditching or other water control 
facilities incidental to planting, cultivating, 
protecting, or harvesting of rice, cranberries, or 
other wetland crop species, where these activities 
and the discharge occur in waters of the United 
States which are in established use for such 
agricultural […] wetland crop production.210 
 
These regulations also define “minor drainage” as: 
 
206 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
232.3(c)(1)(i)(A-B)). 
207 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 
Fed. Reg. 31794 (July 22, 1982). 
208 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
232.3(d)(1)). 
209 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions, 53 
Fed. Reg. 20764, 20775-20776 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.3(d)(3)(i)). 
210 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
232.3(d)(3)(i)(A-B)). 
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(D) The discharge of dredged or fill material 
incidental to the emergency removal of sandbars, 
gravel bars, or other similar blockages which are 
formed during flood flows or other events, where 
such blockages close or constrict previously existing 
drainageways and, if not properly removed, would 
result in damage to or loss of existing crops or 
would impair or prevent the plowing, seeding, 
harvesting or cultivating of crops on land in 
established use for crop production. Such removal 
does not include enlarging or extending the 
dimensions of, or changing the bottom elevations of 
the affected drainageway as it existed prior to the 
formation of the blockage. Removal must be 
accomplished within one year after such blockages 
are discovered in order to be eligible for 
exemption.211  
 
Minor drainage is limited to established farming operations and 
does not include drainage related to wetland conversion. 212 
The abovementioned EPA regulatory exemption provisions 
are identical to those previously set forth in the 1982 Corps 
interim final regulations.213 Furthermore, these regulations 
contain an almost identical recapture provision to that set forth 
in the 1982 Corps interim final regulations.  
 
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into 
waters of the United States incidental to any of the 
activities identified in paragraph (c) of this section 
must have a permit if it is part of an activity whose 
purpose is to convert an area of the [WOTUS] into 
a use to which it was not previously subject, where 
the flow or circulation of [WOTUS] may be 
impaired or the reach of such waters reduced. 
Where the proposed discharge will result in 
 
211 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 
232.3(d)(3)(i)(D)).  
212 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 
232.3(d)(3)(i)). 
213 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 
Fed. Reg. 31794, 31812 (July 22, 1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.4(a)(2)).  




significant discernible alterations to flow or 
circulation, the presumption is that flow or 
circulation may be impaired by such alteration.214 
 
10. 1990 Corps Guidance – RGL 90-07 – ‘Normal 
Circumstances’ of ‘Prior Converted Cropland’ 
 
 In September 1990, the Corps issued RGL 90-07.215 The 
guidance letter distinguished the normal circumstances of 
wetlands subject to pre-December 23, 1985 completed conversions 
(identified as “prior converted croplands”) as defined in § 512.15 
of the National Food Security Manual (“NFSAM”), from the 
normal circumstances of “farmed wetlands” as defined by 
NFSAM § 512.35.216 USDA regulations, meanwhile, state 
wetlands should support life that is typical of the area under 
“normal circumstances.”217 
The manual defines “farmed wetlands” as those 
manipulated and used for agricultural means before December 
23, 1985 but were not fully converted at that time.218 “Prior 
converted croplands,” under the NFSAM are wetlands dredged, 
drained, filled, or in any other way manipulated before December 
23, 1985 to make the production of an agricultural commodity 
possible. 219 
According to the RGL, the “normal circumstances” of 
farmed wetlands, including “areas with 15 or more consecutive 
days (or 10 percent of the growing season whichever is less) of 
inundation during the growing season,” are such that wetland 
soil and hydrological conditions remain despite an absence of 
wetland vegetation due to cropping.220 Thus, the § 404 permitting 
of farmed wetlands is required.221 By contrast, the “normal 
circumstances” of prior converted croplands are such that they 
 
214 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions, 53 
Fed. Reg. 20764, 20775–20776 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.3(b)); 
Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. 
31794, 31812 (July 22, 1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.4(c)). 
215 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Reg. 90-07 (Sept. 26, 1990).  
216 Id. 
217 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 35194, 35207 
(Sept. 17, 1987) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.1(b)(28)). 
218 NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ACT MANUAL (SECOND) § 512.35 (1988).  
219 NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ACT MANUAL (SECOND) § 512.15(a) (1988). 
220 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 215, at 2.  
221 Id. at ¶ 5.b-c. 
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“have been subject to such extensive and relatively permanent 
physical hydrological modifications and alteration of hydro-phytic 
vegetation that the resultant cropland constitutes the ‘normal 
circumstances’ for purposes of [S]ection 404 jurisdiction.”222 Thus, 
they are not subject to CWA § 404 jurisdiction.223  
 
C. Judicial Resort to Legislative History in Absence of Express 
CWA § 404 Statutory Text Addressing Non-Tidal Wetlands 
Adjacent to Manmade Ditches and Converted Wetlands 
 
Federal courts previously broadly inferred Congress’s 
intent to have CWA § 404 cover non-tidal wetlands adjacent to 
manmade agricultural ditches and “converted wetlands” 
primarily from sources other than the statute itself. However, 
each of the following cases was decided prior to Congress’s 
enactment of the Food Security Act of 1985,224 and therefore, did 
not reflect Congress’ subsequent intent to address converted 
wetlands in the context of agriculture under the FSA. 
In United States v. Holland, the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida reverted to unreliable legislative 
history rather than to the statutory text of the CWA.225 It 
concluded Congress, in “defin[ing] away in the FWPCA” the test 
of navigability, intended for CWA jurisdiction to be broader than 
“navigable waters.”226 
 
222 Id (emphasis added). 
223 Id. 
224 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 12211 (1985). 
225 United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). 
226 Id. at 672 (‘The [Committee of Conference] conferees fully intend that the term 
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation 
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for 
administrative purposes.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-1326 at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS, 1972, at 327 (1972)); id. (“In presenting the Conference version to the 
House, Representative Dingell, a member of the Conference Committee, explained the 
Committee’s intention on jurisdiction: ‘The Conference bill defined the term ‘navigable 
waters’ broadly for water quality purposes. (502(7)). It means ‘all the waters of the United 
States’ in a geographic sense. It does not mean ‘navigable waters of the United States’ in 
the technical sense as we sometimes see in some laws.” (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS, 1972, at 250 (1972)); id. (“After a 
brief discussion of Court cases in which the judiciary has forced some expansion of the old 
navigability test for water quality purposes, Representative Dingell concluded: ‘Thus, this 
new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including main streams and their 
tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer are the old, narrow definitions of 
navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters covered by 
this bill.’”); 373 F. Supp. at 673 (“Clearly, Congress has the power to eliminate the 




In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
interpreted CWA § 502(7), which defines “navigable waters” as 
“waters of the United States, including territorial seas,” as 
evidencing Congress’s intent for the CWA to be applied as 
broadly as constitutionally permissible, consistent with the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.227 The D.C. District 
Court then ordered the Corps to publish proposed regulations 
clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act 
within forty days of the Court’s order.228 
In Leslie Salt v. Froehlke, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals similarly held Congress clearly meant to expand the 
definition of navigable waters based on the legislative history.229 
The Court cited the Florida District Court’s holding in Holland, 
which based its definition of “navigable waters” on a broad 
Constitutional interpretation of the Commerce Clause.230 
In Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held “navigable waters” should be 
interpreted broadly by Congress.231 The Court wrote a broad 
definition was needed to better control pollution being discharged 
 
"navigability" limitation from the reach of federal control under the Commerce Clause. . . . 
Now when courts are forced with a challenge to congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause a statute’s validity is upheld by determining first if the general activity sought to 
be regulated is reasonably related to, or has an effect on, interstate commerce and, second, 
whether the specific activities in the case before the court are those intended to be reached 
by Congress through the statute.”). 
227 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) 
(“Congress by defining the term ‘navigable waters’ in Section 502(7) of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (the 
‘Water Act’) to mean ‘the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,’ 
asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible 
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as used in the Water Act, 
the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability.”).  
228 Id.  
229 Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978). 
230 Id. at 754–55 (“It is clear from the legislative history of the FWPCA that for 
the purposes of that Act, Congress intended to expand the narrow definition of the term 
‘navigable waters,’ as used in the Rivers and Harbors Act. This court has indicated that 
the term ‘navigable waters’ within the meaning of the FWPCA is to be given the broadest 
possible constitutional interpretation under the Commerce Clause.”) (citing Cal. v. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 511 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1975), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency v. State Res. Control Bd. 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (“Congress clearly meant to 
extend the Act's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. . .”).  
231 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 915 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
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from a point source.232 In reference to the legislative history, the 
Appellate Court held conversions of wetlands into croplands did 
not constitute “normal farming activities” under § 404(f)(1), 
because that provision’s “exemptions [from permitting] do not 
apply to discharges that convert extensive areas of water into dry 
land or impede circulation or reduce the reach or size of the water 
body.”233 Thus, the Court never reached the § 404(f)(2) recapture 
issue, which required there first be a “normal farming activity.” It 
also ignored the Carter administration Council on Environmental 
Quality finding normal farming activities could include 
converting wetlands to arable land and not be subject to 
recapture,234 so long as extensive areas of water were not 
converted to dry land.235 
In United States v. Huebner, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held navigable waters should be broadly interpreted.236 
The Appellate Court also held the legislative history of the 1977 
CWA amendments persuaded it that the “normal farming 
activities” exemption should be interpreted narrowly in light of 
the broad purpose of the statute.237 The Court in Huebner also 
found that the Akers Court238 even went so far as to state, “[a]s 
 
232 Id. (“The control strategy of the Act extends to navigable waters. The 
definition of this term means the navigable waters of the United States, portions thereof, 
and includes the territorial seas and the Great Lakes. Through narrow interpretation of 
the definition of interstate waters the implementation [of the] 1965 Act was severely 
limited. Water moves in hydrological cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants 
be controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to the control requirements must be made 
to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries.”) (quoting LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, at 1495 (1978).  
233 Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, 715 F.2d at 915.  
234 See The Ninth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, 
supra note 52. 
235 123 CONG. REC. S39,188 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).  
236 United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240–41 (7th Cir. 1985). 
237 Id. (“Our review of the legislative history of the agricultural exemptions 
convinces us that because of the significance of inland wetlands, which make up eighty-
five percent of the nation's wetlands,[9] Congress intended that Section 1344(f)(1) exempt 
from the permit process only ‘narrowly defined activities…that cause little or no adverse 
effects either individually or cumulatively [and which do not] convert more extensive 
areas of water into dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach and size of the 
water body.’” (emphasis added)) (citing 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT, at 420 (1978) (statement of Rep. Harsha, member of the conference committee, 
during House debates).  
238 See Akers, 785 F.2d at 819. 




the legislation’s primary sponsor, [former Senator Muskie’s] 
remarks are entitled to substantial weight.”239  
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the 
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Corps’s regulatory definition of 
the term “adjacent wetlands,” in the context of “navigable 
waters.”240 The Court held deference should be given to the 
agency’s reasonable construction of a stature provided it also does 
not challenge Congress’s expressed intent.241 According to the 
Court, such review was “limited to the question whether the 
agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable, in light of the 
language, policies, and legislative history of the Act, for the Corps 
to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to but not 
regularly flooded by rivers, streams and other hydrographic 
features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters.’”242 The 
Court also held agencies may consider legislative history and 
policies if the regulatory authority is unclear.243 These 
approaches supported the regulatory authority to define waters 
as they did.244  
In United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, the 
District Court held Congress’s overwhelming goal was to prevent 
wetland conversion.245 The Court reached this conclusion having 
looked to § 404’s legislative history to define the scope of “normal 
farming activities” exemption under § 404(f)(1)(A) and the scope 
of the § 404(f)(2) recapture provision.246 The Court extensively 
cited the legislative history to which the Circuit Courts in 
Akers,247 Huebner,248 and Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League249 
 
239 Id. citing Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 
548, 564, 96 S.Ct. 2295, 2304, 49 L.Ed.2d 49 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1243 & n. 48 (D.C.Cir.1980). 
240 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). 
241 Id. at 131, citing Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 125 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). 
242 Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 131.  
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 132.  
245 United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D. 
Mass. 1986). 
246 647 F. Supp., slip op. at 14. 
247 Akers, 785 F.2d at 819. 
248 Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1240–41. 
249 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., 715 F.2d at 925. 
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referred, and accorded the prior remarks of former Senator 
Muskie “substantial weight.”250  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Brace, in citing many of these cases, gleaned unreliable snippets 
from the same legislative history and reached the same 
conclusion.251 The Appellate Court held, “the two parts of Section 
404(f) […when read together…] provide a narrow exemption for 
agricultural activities that have little or no adverse effect on the 
waters of the United States.”252  
As previously mentioned, at least one legal commentator 
found the Court’s ruling in Chevron had been based neither on 
statute nor precedent, but rather on “‘institutional considerations’ 
typical of the ‘legal process’ school of interpretation then 
dominant in the legal academy, which emphasized agency 
expertise . . . [and] democratic accountability.”253 Given the rapid 
expansion of the administrative state since these cases had been 
decided, it is more than arguable these prior institutional 
presumptions are no longer valid.  
Each of these decisions, moreover, preceded the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s later ruling in United States v. Lopez. In Lopez, 
the Court held the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress 
authority to prohibit gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school 
on federalism grounds, because it did not qualify as a 
“commercial” use “substantially affecting” interstate commerce 
(i.e., it did not address the commerce of guns).254 Lopez more 
broadly held the Commerce Clause limits Congressional power to 
“‘commercial’ uses that ‘substantially affect’ interstate 
commerce.”255  
The Lopez Court found Congress did not express the 
federal statute’s purpose as displacing the states’ historical police 
 
250 Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, 647 F. Supp., slip op. at 13–14, citing 3 
Leg. Hist. 474 (1977). 
251 Brace, 41 F.3d at 124 (3d Cir. 1994), citing Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. 
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926 (5th Cir. 1983); 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act 
of 1977: A Continuation of the Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act, at 
474 (1978). 
252 Brace, 41 F.3d at 124. 
253 See Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh And The ‘Chevron Doctrine, STAN. U. HOOVER 
INST. (July 30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine 
[https://perma.cc/4YLY-B5VH]. 
254 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–83 (1995). 
255 Vickie Sutton, Wetlands Protection – A Goal Without a Statute, 7 S.C. ENV. 
LAW REV. 179, 190 (1998). 




power over education.256 The Kennedy concurrence in Lopez 
concluded the statute’s interference with state sovereignty and 
disruption of “the federal balance the Framers designed and that 
this Court is obliged to enforce” was significant.257 At least two 
legal commentators concluded Lopez could potentially invalidate 
the application of federal agency regulations to wetlands and 
converted wetlands on Commerce Clause grounds.258  
These commentators reasoned since the CWA regulations 
control the environment, rather than the commerce of wetlands, 
the CWA regulations intrude upon a traditional concern of the 
States and should be invalidated.259 Indeed, Congress intended to 
delegate the obligation to maintain water quality under the CWA 
to the states.260 Granted, at the time these articles had been 
written, the likelihood was small Lopez could successfully defeat 
Congress’s CWA § 404 jurisdiction over freshwater nontidal 
wetlands, given federal courts’ reluctance to define navigability 
under a plain meaning analysis where the term had been defined 
by the agency.261 However, the Court’s new perspective since 
having reviewed and tightened its Chevron, Auer, and Seminole 
Rock precedents on agency deference may today result in a 
different outcome.  
 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT FEDERAL 
COURTS AND AGENCIES PRIMARILY IGNORED THE TEXT OF THE 
FSA WHICH CLEARLY ADDRESSED THE TREATMENT OF NON-TIDAL 
WETLANDS ADJACENT TO MANMADE DITCHES AND ‘CONVERTED 
WETLANDS’ 
 
A. The Food Security Act is the Only Federal Statute that 
Addresses Wetland Conservation  
 
The Food Security Act of 1985 “was the first [federal] 
statute to define ‘wetland’ using explicit terms and 
 
256 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
257 Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
258 See Sutton, supra note 255, at 187–190. 
259 Id. 
260 See id. at 187–190; See also Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 92-217, 
§1344 §404(g)(1), 91 Stat. 1601 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1344(g)(1) (2019)).  
261 See Sutton supra note 255, at 190. 
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requirements.”262 In fact, Congress has never stated wetland 
protection as a goal, excluding the “Swampbuster” provision of 
the FSA.263 By comparison, the Clean Water amendments of 1977 
used the term ‘wetland’ only when discussing the State’s role in § 
404 administration.264  
 
[T]he history shows Congress intended to transfer 
the wetlands program, . . . as well as the . . . 
permitting program, to the states as soon as 
possible. Moreover, the use of the term ‘navigable 
waters’ as the source for jurisdiction over wetlands 
demonstrates the broad reading of the statute, 
which has also caused difficulties with 
implementation and jurisdiction.265  
 
“‘The result of this legislative [amendment] process was to leave 
the section 404 program substantially intact and to give the 
administering agencies little new guidance for the definition or 
delineation of wetlands.’”266 
The FSA also was the first federal statute to require those 
in the industry to manage and protect wetlands for USDA 
benefits.267 The FSA conditioned eligibility for USDA farm 
benefits, first, on producers not “converting” a wetland, and 
second, on producers securing an exemption for the conversion 
activity qualifying it as either commenced or completed prior to 
December 23, 1985.268 From its enactment date, the FSA 
determined when actual conversion of a wetland occurred.269 An 
actual conversion of a wetland, in other words, occurs if an 
agricultural commodity was produced on a converted wetland. 
 
 
262 Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal Regulation: Analysis of 
the Food Security Act "Swampbuster" Provisions as Amended by the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 201, 225–26 (1997). 
263 See Sutton supra note 255, at 179. 
264 See McBeth, supra note 262.  
265 See Sutton, supra note 255, at 179. 
266 See McBeth, supra note 262, at 226. 
267 Id. at 231. 
268 Id. at 232–233. 
269 Id. at 233, n.208; Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §1221(1), 99 
Stat. 1354, 1507 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §3821(1)). 




B. Food Security Act (“FSA”) Statutory Text Defines Wetlands 
and ‘Converted Wetlands’ and Thereby Covers Nontidal 
Wetlands Adjacent to Manmade Agricultural Ditches and 
‘Converted Wetlands’ 
 
1. Relevant FSA Statutory Text 
 
FSA § 1221(1) provides, “[e]xcept as provided in [FSA §] 
section 1222 and notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
following the date of enactment of this Act, any person who in 
any crop year produces an agricultural commodity on converted 
wetland shall be ineligible for” various otherwise available 
United States Department of Agriculture program loans, 
payments and benefits.270  
Arguably, the “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law” language of FSA § 1221(1), which together with FSA § 1204 
define “converted wetlands,” conveys Congress’s intent, in light of 
the FSA’s enactment after the 1977 CWA amendments, that the 
“commenced conversions of wetlands” exemption not be affected 
by § 404, which did not address such term at all.271  
FSA § 1222(a)(1) provides individuals will not become 
ineligible for benefits under FSA § 1221 because of agricultural 
production on a converted wetland so long as the conversion was 
before the Act’s date of enactment.272 FSA § 1201(a)(1)(A) defined 
the term “agricultural commodity” as “any agricultural 
commodity planted and produced in a State by annual tilling of 
the soil, including tilling by one-trip planters.”273  
In stark contrast to § 404, FSA § 1201(a)(4)(A) defined the 
term “converted wetland,” as “drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or 
otherwise manipulated” land allowing for agriculture commodity 
 
270 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99-198, § 1221(1), 99 Stat. at 1507-08 
(emphasis added).  
271 See Schneider v. United States, 27 F.3d 1327, 1331 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the “’notwithstanding any other provision of law’” in question regarding the finality of 
the Secretary’s decision was “clear on its face” and “clearly expresse[d] Congress’s intent 
to preclude judicial review and presents no ambiguity that would give rise to a 
presumption in favor of judicial review.”); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 
92 F.3d 792, 796, 797 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “that the phrase ‘notwithstanding any other 
law’ is not always construed literally,” and that the “notwithstanding any other law” 
clause in question “directs the disregard only of the federal environmental and natural 
resources laws, with respect to Option 9 sales.”). 
272 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99–198, § 1222(a)(1), 99 Stat. 1354, 
1508 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 3822(a)).  
273 Id. 
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production.274 It includes any activity resulting in the impairment 
or reduction of flow, circulation, or reach of water for such 
purposes.275 In addition, the conversion activity must have been 
undertaken to ensure the possibility of agricultural commodity 
production which otherwise would not have been possible, and 
the manipulated land was a wetland before the action and was 
not considered a highly erodible cropland.276 The FSA defines the 
term “wetland” apart from the definition of “converted wetland,” 
which § 404 does not.277 The FSA definition of a “wetland” is land 
primarily containing hydric soils and so saturated with water the 
ground will support hydrophytic flora.278 Given the FSA’s 
considered definitions of ‘wetland’ and ‘converted wetland,’ it is 
evident that Congress had intended for the FSA, unlike the CWA, 
to cover all tidal coastal wetlands and non-tidal freshwater 
wetlands.  
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 
1990 (“FACTA”) amended the FSA by empowering the USDA 
Secretary, and his/her likely delegatee to perform an onsite 
wetland determination at the landowner’s or land operator’s 
request, as opposed to a remote wetland determination based on 
aerial photographs; otherwise, FACTA required the USDA 
Secretary and his/her delegatee, to perform wetland delineations 
on wetland delineation maps as a condition of eligibility to receive 
farm program loans, payments or benefits.279 FACTA, also, added 
a new section allowing land owners and operators to appeal the 
USDA Secretary determinations of their wetland status, and, in 
case such a determination is reversed on appeal, for eligibility to 




276 Food Security Act of 1985, § 1201(a)(4)(A) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(4)(A)).  
277 See Food Security Act of 1985 § 1201(a)(16) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
3801(a)(16)) (amended 1990). 
278 Food Security Act of 1985 § 1201(a)(16) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(16)) 
(amended 1990).  
279 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, sec. 1422, 
§1222(a)(1), 104 Stat. 3359, 3573; id. at 3754.  
280 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, sec. 1422, §1222(e), 
104 Stat. 3359, 3574 (The Secretary shall exempt from the ineligibility provisions of 
section 1221 any action by a person upon lands in any case in which the Secretary 
determines that any one of the following does not apply with respect to such lands: (1) 
Such lands have a predominance of hydric soils. (2) Such lands are inundated or saturated 
by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support a prevalence 
of hydrophytic vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. (3) Such 
lands, under normal circumstances, support a prevalence of such vegetation.”).  





2. Congressional Intent and USDA 
  
(a) ‘Converted Wetland’ 
 
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the FSA 
indicates that the Conference Committee had adopted the House 
definition of “converted wetland” set forth in § 1201(a)(4)(A) and 
codified in 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(4)(A): 
 
The House bill defines the term ‘converted wetland’ 
to mean wetland that has been converted by 
certain activity making the production of 
agricultural commodities possible that would not 
have been possible but for such activity and that, 
before such activity was taken, was wetland and 
not highly erodible land nor highly erodible 
cropland with several exemptions listed. (Sec. 
1201(4).) The Senate amendment is comparable 
with respect to ‘converted wetland’ except that it 
does not apply to highly erodible cropland (Sec. 
1601(a)(4)(A), and though the exemptions are 
similar they are stated differently. The Conference 
substitute adopts the House provision” (italicized 
emphasis in original).281 
 
(b) Pre-December 23, 1985 ‘Commenced Conversion’  
 
The legislative history surrounding the “commenced 
conversion” exemption provision of the FSA is contained in the 
Congressional Record and Conference Report of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. The congressional record for December 17, 1985 
indicates that the Conference Committee had reconciled the 
difference between the House preference that only “completed 
conversions” should be eligible for exemption, and the Senate’s 
broader preference that “commenced conversions” should be 
eligible for exemption, by adopting the Senate’s broader 
preference.282 
 
281 H.R. REP. NO. 99–447 at 454–55 (1985) (Conf. Rep.).  
282 131 CONG. REC. 36815, 37106 (1985).  
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The Conference Report accompanying the FSA 
corroborates this interpretation of the FSA commenced 
conversion provision. It states as follows:  
 
(7) Exemption for wetland (Sec. 1222)(a) The House 
bill exempts converted wetland from the program 
ineligibility provision of section 1202 if the land 
became converted wetland before the date of 
enactment of the bill. (Sec. 1203(a)(6).) The Senate 
amendment exempts converted wetland if the 
conversion of the wetland was commenced before 
the date of enactment of the bill. (Sec. 1622(a)(1).) 
The Conference substitute adopts the Senate 
amendment. The Conferees intend that conversion 
of wetland is considered to be “commenced'’ when a 
person has obligated funds or begun actual 
modification of the wetland.” (italicized emphasis 
in original).283  
 
This legislative history surrounding “commenced 
conversions” strongly suggests that USDA’s addition of the term 
“completed conversion” in the final September 17, 1987 USDA 
regulations tracked the House version of the exemption from 
converted wetlands the Conference Committee Report had 
previously rejected. The USDA improperly went beyond the 
statutory text of FSA § 1222(a) and the Conference Report to 
create a new category of converted wetland for political purposes. 
 
C. Food Security Act (“FSA”) Regulations re ‘Converted 
Wetlands’ 
 
1. 1986 USDA Interim Regulations  
 
The interim FSA regulation’s preamble stated that 
“Sections 1211 and 1221 of the Act [FSA] were designed to 
remove the incentive that certain benefits provided by the 
Department could give producers to cultivate highly erodible land 
or to convert wetlands for the purpose of producing an 
 
283 H.R. REP. NO. 99–447 at 460.  




agricultural commodity.”284 The interim regulations define an 
“agricultural commodity” as “any crop planted and produced by 
annual tilling of the soil or on an annual basis.”285 
The interim regulations also rested the exemption from 
ineligibility to receive USDA program benefits set forth in 
§1222(a) upon a showing of “commenced conversion.”286 “A person 
shall not be determined to be ineligible for program benefits in as 
the result of the production of a crop of an agricultural commodity 
on: (i) Converted wetland if the conversion of such wetland was 
commenced before December 23, 1985,”287 and such crop had been 
“planted during the period December 23, 1985, through June 27, 
1986.”288 According to the interim regulations,  
 
The conversion of a wetland will be considered to 
have been commenced before December 23, 1985, if, 
before December 23, 1985, earth moving for the 
purpose of draining the wetland was actually 
started, or the person applying for the benefits has 
legally and financially committed substantial funds 
by entering into a contract providing for earth 
moving, or otherwise, for the purpose of converting 
the wetland. (emphasis added).289 
 
The 1986 interim final regulations also defined the term 
“converted wetlands” consistent with FSA § 1201(a)(4):  
 
 
284 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 23496 (June 
27, 1986).  
285 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 23496, 23499, 
23496, 23502 (June 27, 1986) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12).  
286 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496, 
23504. 
287 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496, 
23504.  
288 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496, 
23504.  
289 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496, 
23500 ("It has been determined that a person shall be considered to have commenced the 
conversion of a wetland by December 23, 1985, if, prior to December 23, 1985, such person: 
(1) Began substantial earth moving for the purpose of draining the wetland or (2) legally 
and financially committed substantial funds, by entering into a contract for earth moving, 
or otherwise, for the purpose of draining the wetland. The Department shall determine 
the amount of land which is exempt under this provision based upon the amount of land 
which would be drained by the earth moving required in the contract or, if there is no 
contract, which would be drained by the earth moving which had begun prior to December 
23, 1985.”).  
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‘Converted wetland’ means wetland that has been 
drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise 
manipulated (including any activity that results in 
impairing or reducing the flow, circulation, or reach 
of water) for the purpose or to have the effect of 
making the production of an agricultural 
commodity possible if: (i) Such production would 
not have. Been possible but for such action; and (ii) 
before such action (A) such land was wetland; and 
(B) such land was neither highly erodible land nor 
highly erodible cropland. (emphasis added).290 
 
The 1986 interim regulations, furthermore, set forth 
criteria for determining whether land is a “converted wetland.” 
For example, 
 
For the purpose of determining whether land is a 
converted wetland in accordance with § 12.2(a)(6) 
of this part, a wetland shall be determined to have 
been drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise 
manipulated for the purpose or to have the effect of 
making the production of an agricultural 
commodity possible, if the producer or any of the 
producer's predecessors in interest caused or 
permitted: (1) The removal of one or more of the 
hydric soils criteria of such wetland; or (2) The 
removal or destruction of hydrophytic vegetation on 
such wetland and a prevalence of hydrophytic 
vegetation is determined to exist on the same 
hydric soil map unit in the local area. (emphasis 
added).291 
 
290 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 23496-01, 
23502 (June 27, 1986) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).  
291 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23507 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. 12.32 (1987)) checked. Section 12.32(a) of the interim rule provides 
that a wetland shall be determined to have been drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or 
otherwise manipulated for the purpose or to have the effect of making the production of an 
agricultural commodity possible if (1) one or more of the hydric soils criteria of such 
wetland has been removed or (2) the hydrophytic vegetation on such wetland has been 
removed or destroyed. The removal of one or more of the hydric soils criteria or the 
removal or destruction of hydrophytic vegetation removes one or more of the criteria that 
characterizes an area as wetland. The removal of one or more of the hydric soils criteria or 
the removal or destruction of hydrophytic vegetation is an objective measure of the effect 
an action has on a wetland. It is a good indication as to whether the action has been taken 





The interim regulations defined “[h]ydric soils” as “soils that, in 
an undrained condition, are saturated, flooded or ponded long 
enough during a growing season to develop an anaerobic 
condition that supports the growth and regeneration of 
hydrophytic vegetation.”292 The interim regulations defined 
“hydrophytic vegetation” as a plant growing (i) in water; or (ii) a 
substrate that is at least periodically deficient in oxygen during a 
growing season as a result of excessive water content.”293 
 
2. 1987 USDA Final Regulations 
 
 The final 1987 USDA “amended the interim rule 
published at 51 FR 23496 (June 27, 1986) and applied to crops 
planted after the effective date of this rule and to all 
determinations made after or pending on the effective date of this 
rule.”294 The final regulations nevertheless maintained the 
definitions of “hydric soils,” “hydrophytic vegetation,” and the 
criteria SCS shall use for determining the presence of each such 
wetland identification parameter set forth in the 1986 interim 
regulations.295 The final regulations also maintained the 
definition of “wetland” set forth in the interim regulations.296 The 
final regulations, like the interim regulations appear to follow the 
definition contained in the statute.297 This definition appears to 
be consistent with the federal 3-parameter wetland 
identification/delineation standard set forth in the Corps 1987 
Wetland Delineation Manual: hydric soils, hydrology, and 
 
for the purpose or to have the effect of making the production of an agricultural 
commodity possible on such wetland. Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 
Fed. Reg. at 23499. The interim regulations also provided that, “an agricultural 
commodity shall be considered to have been ‘produced’ on […] converted wetland if the 
agricultural commodity has been planted.” Highly Erodible Land and Wetland 
Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23499.  
292 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23503 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).  
293 Id.  
294 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 35194, 35194 
(Sept. 17, 1987). 
295 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35201 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)); 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.31(a)-(b)(3)(iv)(B)(1987).  
296 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35202 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).  
297 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §1201, 99 Stat. 1354, 123-24 
(1985) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3801).  
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hydrophytic vegetation.298 It does not appear, however, that SCS 
was practically required to identify the presence of the wetland 
hydrology parameter.299  
“SCS shall determine whether an area of a field or other 
parcel of land has a preponderance of hydric soils that are 
inundated or saturated,” and “which meet criteria set forth in the 
publication ‘Hydric Soils of the United States 1985’[…]which is 
incorporated by reference.”300 In addition, the SCS shall 
determine whether land has a prevalence of hydrophytic 
vegetation present:  
 
For purposes of the definition of ‘wetland,’ […] land 
shall be determined to have a prevalence of 
hydrophytic vegetation if (i) SCS determines 
through the use of the formula specified in 
paragraph (b)(3) […] that under normal 
circumstances, such land supports a prevalence of 
hydrophytic vegetation. The term ‘normal 
circumstances’ refers to the soil and hydrologic 
conditions that are normally present, without 
regard to whether the vegetation has been 
removed.” (emphasis added).301 
 
Further, “[i]n the event the vegetation on such land has been 
altered or removed, SCS will determine if a prevalence of 
hydrophytic vegetation typically exists in the local area on the 
same hydric soil under the same hydrological conditions.”302 
Significantly, the final regulations amended the definition 
of “converted wetlands” found in the interim regulations.303 A 
wetland was no longer deemed converted if further manipulations 
of the land (i.e., draining, dredging, filling, leveling) were 




298 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35207 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.31 (1987)).  
299 See generally id. 
300 Id.  
301 Id.  
302 Id.  
303 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35201 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)). 
304 Id.  




‘Converted wetland’ means wetland that has been 
drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise 
manipulated (including any activity that results in 
impairing or reducing the flow, circulation, or reach 
of water) that makes possible the production of an 
agricultural commodity without further application 
of the manipulations described herein if (i) such 
production would not have been possible but for 
such action; and (ii) before such action, such land 
was wetland and was neither highly erodible land 
nor highly erodible cropland.305 (emphasis added). 
 
The final regulations also amended the criteria for 
identifying when a wetland has been converted. “Converted 
wetland shall be identified by determining whether the wetland 
was altered so as to meet the definition of converted wetland set 
forth in [7 CFR] § 12.2(a)(6):  
 
(1) Where hydric soils have been used for 
production of an agricultural commodity and the 
drainage or other altering activity is not clearly 
discernible, SCS will compare the site with other 
sites containing the same hydric soils in a natural 
condition to determine if the hydric soils can or 
cannot be used to produce an agricultural 
commodity under normal conditions. If the soil on 
the comparison site could not produce an 
agricultural commodity under natural conditions, 
the subject wetland will be considered a converted 
wetland. (emphasis added).306 
 
(2) Where woody hydrophytic vegetation has been 
removed from hydric soils which permits the 
production of an agricultural commodity, and 
wetlands conditions have not returned as the result 
of abandonment under § 12.33(b), the area will be 
considered to be converted wetland.307 
 
 
305 Id.  
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 35208.  
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The final regulations explained how to apply the definition of 
“agricultural commodity” provided in the interim regulations. For 
example, “grasses not tilled annually […] do not meet the 
definition of an agricultural commodity,” while “grass[es…] used 
as a high residue crop in a crop rotation, as distinguished from 
permanent hayland or grassland, the existing crop rotation and 
management techniques may be considered an acceptable 
conservation system for the field.” (emphasis added).308  
 The regulations broadened the exemption from 
ineligibility to receive USDA program benefits for production of 
an agricultural commodity on converted wetlands if the 
conversion “was commenced or completed” before December 23, 
1985.309 In other words, the 1987 regulations added the new 
concept of “prior converted croplands” (“PCC”):  
 
The conversion of a wetland […] will be considered 
to have been completed before December 23, 1985, 
if, before that date, the draining, dredging, 
leveling, filling or other manipulation, (including 
any activity that resulted in the impairing or 
reducing the flow, circulation, or reach of water) 
was applied to the wetland and made the 
production of an agricultural commodity possible 
without further manipulation described herein, 
where such production on the wetland would not 
otherwise have been possible. (emphasis added). 
[…Pre-12-23-85] converted wetlands may be 
improved by additional drainage, provided that no 
additional wetland or abandoned converted 
wetland is brought into production of an 
agricultural commodity.”310 (emphasis added). 
 
The regulations consider the conversion of a wetland to have 
commenced prior to December 23, 1985 if, before such date:  
 
(i) Any of the activities described in § 12.2(a)(6) 
[i.e., drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise 
 
308 Id. at 35196.  
309 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35203 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.5 (1987)).  
310 Id.  




manipulated (including any activity that results in 
impairing or reducing the flow, circulation, or reach 
of water)] were actually started on the wetland; or  
 
(ii) The person applying for benefits has expended 
or legally committed substantial funds either by 
entering into a contract for the installation of any 
of the activities described in § 12.2(a)(6) or by 
purchasing construction supplies or materials for 
the primary and direct purpose of converting the 
wetland. (emphasis added).311  
 
According to USDA, the final 1987 regulations were 
intended to provide persons who commenced a conversion with 
the opportunity to complete that conversion without unnecessary 
hardships:  
 
The purpose of the determination of conversion 
commencement […] is to implement the legislative 
intent that those persons who had actually started 
conversion of wetland or obligated funds for 
conversion prior to the effective date of the Act 
(December 23, 1985) would be allowed to complete 
the conversion so as to avoid unnecessary economic 
hardship. (emphasis added).312 
 
The final regulations thus provided directions to those 
who sought to qualify for their pre-December 23, 1985 
commenced conversion:  
 
(i) All persons who believe they have a wetland or 
converted wetland for which conversion began but 
was not completed prior to December 23, 1985, 
must, before September 19, 1988, request ASCS to 
make a determination of commencement in order to 
be considered for exemption under § 12.4(d)(1)(i).  
 
(ii) A person must show that the commenced 
activity has been actively pursued or the 
 
311 Id.  
312 Id.  
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conversion will not be exempt under this section. In 
this context, ‘actively pursued’ means that efforts 
toward the completion of the conversion activity 
have continued on a regular basis since initiation of 
the conversion, except for delays due to 
circumstances beyond the person’s control. […] Any 
conversion activity considered to be commenced 
under this section shall lose its exempt status if not 
completed on or before January 1, 1995. Only those 
wetlands for which the construction has begun or to 
which the contract or purchased supplies and 
materials relate may qualify for a determination of 
commencement. (emphasis added).313 
 
A commenced conversion designation qualifies the 
converted area or the minimum area the commenced activity 
could convert for the exemption from ineligibility:  
 
The final regulations, moreover, ensure that the 
“production of an agricultural commodity on 
wetlands converted before, or for which the 
conversion was commenced before [12-23-85] is 
exempt from [7 CFR § 12] for the area which was 
converted or the minimum area the commenced 
activity could convert.” (emphasis added). 
“Maintenance or improvement of these converted 
wetlands for the production of agricultural 
commodities are not subject to this rule so long as 
such actions do not bring additional wetland into 
the production of an agricultural commodity. 
Additional wetland means any natural wetland or 
any converted wetland that has reverted to wetland 
as the result of abandonment of crop production. 
(emphasis added).314 
 
The 1987 FSA regulations also imposed a new 
requirement on persons seeking a pre-December 23, 1985 
conversion exemption “to show when a wetland was converted or 
 
313 Id. at 35203–04.  
314 Id. at 35208. 




when conversion was commenced.”315 To this end, “[c]rop history 
may be used in converted wetland determinations to analyze the 
extent of conversion and the purposes for which conversion was 
undertaken.”316 In addition to crop history data, persons must 
provide as evidence, “receipts,” “drawings,” “plans” or other 
materials showing conversion began or completed before 
December 23, 1985.317 Further, the final 1987 regulations defined 
the term “abandonment” for “converted wetlands,” a term distinct 
from both prior commenced conversions and prior converted 
wetlands.318 Abandonment occurs where “cropping, management 
or maintenance operations related to the production of 
agricultural commodities on converted wetlands” ceases 
(emphasis added).319 Where cropping, management or 
maintenance operations have ceased, the wetland is abandoned 
unless it can be proven there was no intent to abandon it.320 If 
there is no crop production for five years, then wetland criteria 
must be determined.321  
 
VI. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CAN 
EXERCISE THEIR EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO APPLY THE 1993 
JOINT EPA-CORPS RETROACTIVE REGULATIONS TO ENSURE THE 
PROPER AND CONSISTENT PLAIN TEXTUAL MEANING OF 
‘CONVERTED WETLANDS’ FOR CWA AND FSA PURPOSES 
 
A. Joint EPA-Corps 1993 Regulations Distinguish Between 
Wetlands and ‘Converted Wetlands’ Retroactively for CWA 
and FSA Purposes, & Broadly Reference USDA-SCS NFSAM 
Guidance322 
 
315 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35200 (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.32 (1987)). 
316 Id.  




321 Id. 12.33  
322 See Lawrence A. Kogan, CWA § 404: How So Few Words Re Wetlands Have 
So Greatly Impaled Private Property Rights, supra, n. 2, at Sec. II(A)4(m)(xviii)(II)(F), at 
46, 48 (referring 33. CFR § 328.3(b)(6) and (c)(9) of Department of Defense, Department of 
the Army, Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency, The  Navigable  
Waters  Protection  Rule:  Definition  of  ‘Waters  of  the  United  States’ –  Final  Rule  
(Jan.  23,  2020)  (prepublication                                      rule), 85 Fed. Reg. 22250, 22255, 
22317, 22320, 22326-27, (April 21, 2020) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-
01/documents/navigable_waters_protection_rule_prepbulication.pdf ). 
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In August 1993, following the close of discovery but prior 
to the trial in the action at bar, the EPA and the Corps issued 
joint regulations endeavoring “to codify existing policy as 
reflected in [Corps] RGL 90-07, that prior converted cropland is 
not waters of the United States to help achieve consistency 
among various federal programs affecting wetlands […B]oth 
agencies continue[d] to follow the guidance provided by RGL 90-7, 
which interpret[ed] our regulatory definition of wetlands to 
exclude PC cropland.”323 Significantly, the regulation’s preamble 
acknowledged how administrative/regulatory consistency 
between the CWA and FSA could be enhanced if the EPA and the 
Corps, like the USDA-SCS, learned to broadly and flexibly utilize 
the guidance contained in the National Food Security Act Manual 
(“NFSAM”).324  
The 1993 joint regulations effectively signaled the intent 
of the EPA and the Corps to harmonize the term “converted 
wetland” for purposes of ensuring consistency between CWA § 
404 and FSA §§ 1204 and 1222.325 These regulations achieved 
this objective by promoting increased interagency (EPA-USDA-
Corps) consultation and going beyond the specific USDA-NFSAM 
provisions referenced in Corps RGL 90-07, as appropriate, when 
addressing “prior converted cropland” and “farmed wetland” 
issues.326 These regulations accorded retroactive treatment to all 
pre-December 23, 1985 prior converted croplands as other than 
“waters of the United States” if they had not been “abandoned.”327 
In determining whether a prior converted cropland had been 
abandoned, these regulations directed the EPA and the Corps to 
use the SCS provisions on ‘abandonment,’ – i.e., the September 
17, 1987 regulation and the NFSAM provisions.328 
Although the EPA-Corps August 25, 1993 regulation 
discusses the SCS abandonment standard in the context of prior 
converted cropland, it is clear the SCS abandonment standard 
the EPA referenced in the NFSAM was the same standard 
contained in the September 17, 1987 USDA regulations, and such 
 
323 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45031–32 (Aug. 
25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R).  
324 Id. at 45031–34. 
325 Id. 
326 Id.  
327 Id. at 45036–37 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R pt.230).  
328 Id. at 40534.  




standard applies to all “converted wetlands” – both to prior 
completed conversions and to prior commenced conversions.329 
Thus, if a prior commenced conversion was abandoned under 
circumstances other than those beyond the landowner’s control 
(e.g., due to intentional disruption, thwarting and nullification of 
a prior commenced conversion by federal agencies collaborating 
with third-party environmental and wildlife groups for ideological 
reasons), such that it could no longer be “actively pursued” 
pursuant to 7 CFR § 12.5(d)(5)(ii)-(iii), and consequently, 
completed by January 1, 1995, the commenced conversion would 
have lost its exempt status, and thus, its eligibility to become 
prior converted croplands.330  
Hence, the USDA-SCS treatment the EPA and the Corps 
accorded to prior converted croplands deemed “abandoned” (i.e., 
not actively pursued during a successive 5-year period), is 
arguably analogous to the treatment USDA-SCS accorded to 
prior commenced conversions deemed “abandoned” (i.e., not 
completed to become prior converted croplands) before the 
expiration of the four-year-plus January 1, 1995 window period 
the 1987 USDA regulations had provided.331 In each case, the 
subject land would lose its exempt status under both the FSA and 
the CWA.332  
In Brace, Defendants endeavored to complete their prior 
commenced conversion before January 1, 1995, so the 30-acre 
Murphy tract would be treated as prior converted cropland 
excluded from the definition of “waters of the United States,” and 
thus from CWA § 404 jurisdiction.333 By September 21, 1988, 
USDA had already designated the Murphy tract 30-acre area 
(Field 14 on the USDA Form SCS-CPA-026) as a “converted 
wetland” (“CW”) also qualifying as a prior commenced conversion 
(“CC”) under the FSA.334 Defendants had intended to return to 
USDA to secure a determination that the agricultural commodity 
crops they had grown and harvested (i.e., produced) on the 
Murphy tract 30-acre area – rye in 1986 and oats and hay in 1987 
 
329 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 35194 (Sept. 17, 1987) 
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12). 
330 See id. at 121; see also ECF No. 279 supra note 80 at 34-35; Highly Erodible 
Land and Wetland Conservation Determination at 4, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 
279-202. 
331 See id. 
332 See id.  
333 See Brace, 41 F.3d at 119–20 (3d Cir. 1994). 
334 See id. at 121. 
62     KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.  [Vol. 12 No. 3] 
 
– had qualified that land as prior converted cropland (“PC”) 
entitled to exclusion from CWA § 404 jurisdiction.335 However, by 
this time, EPA, USFWS, and USDA-SCS officials had already 
intervened and begun to entirely disrupt these efforts. For 
example, in 1987 and 1988, these agencies had issued multiple 
administrative CWA violation notices, cease-and-desist orders 
and threats of federal litigation.336 
DOJ-ENRD trial counsel, years ago, clearly admitted the 
Government had intentionally disrupted Mr. Brace’s completion 
of his prior commenced conversion to “protect the wetland.”337 
There is also the “subject of prior converted, prior commenced.”338 
The court found this was not a prior converted crop land, and 
determined, by stipulation, “this was a wetland at the time of the 
discharges.”339 According to the Government, the only thing 
commenced conversion reveals is “Mr. Brace commenced the 
conversion.”340 As Mr. Brace himself says, “the EPA stopped him 
before he could complete the tubing, before he could complete the 
conversion” (emphasis added).341  
USG counsel’s admitted disruption of Defendant’s prior 
“commenced conversion” of the Murphy tract 30-acre area, 
however, should have estopped EPA at trial from arguing 
 
335 See Tr. of Non-Jury Trial Proceedings at 19-21, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, 
ECF No. 279-40. 
336 See Brace, 41 F.3d at 119–21. 
337 See ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335, at 539. 
338 Id. 
339 Id.; see ECF No. 279 supra note 80 at 57 (arguing that the Government had 
improperly misrepresented to the District Court the character of the pretrial stipulation it 
had executed with Brace on November 26, 1993 regarding the wetland status of the 30-
acre area. The stipulation was not a stipulation of fact grounded upon a scientifically valid 
wetland delineation of that specific area, but rather a stipulation of law grounded upon a 
general EPA-Corps regulatory definition of “wetland” which the district court could have 
reviewed de novo. Although the district court had found there was “a wetlands on 
stipulation,” it proceeded to find “that not more than 25% of the site met the definition.” 
(citing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at para. 4, ECF No. 55)); Neither the 
District Court nor the Third Circuit, however, ever considered the caselaw regarding the 
extent to which federal courts are bound by party stipulations of fact and law, The case 
law shows, to the contrary, that federal courts have disregarded stipulations of fact where 
they are manifestly untrue. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281 
(1917). And, it shows federal courts have disavowed and ruled they are not bound by 
stipulations of law. See Swift, 243 U.S. at 289; Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 308 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1939); Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Clarke, 955 
F.2d 731, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Sebold v. Sebold, 444 F.2d 864, 870 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F. 3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2006); Becker v. Poling Transp. Corp., 356 
F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2004).   
340 ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335, at 539. 
341 Id.  




Defendant Robert Brace had “abandoned” it, given the USDA-
NFSAM’s criteria for determination of abandonment.342 Pursuant 
to those criteria, Mr. Brace’s performance of ongoing 
management and maintenance activities (including agricultural 
ditch maintenance, drainage tile system repair/replacement 
work, mowing) had supported his “commenced conversion” of that 
area from farmed pasturelands and hay lands to croplands – i.e., 
in preparation for the planting of an agricultural commodity, had 
been “actively pursued” and actually produced an agricultural 
commodity in 1986 and 1987.343 It would most likely have been 
completed, certainly before January 1, 1995, but for, the 
disruption caused by the issuance of multiple federal agency 
CWA violation notices, compliance orders and cease-and-desist 
letters.  
USG’s prior trial counsel proceeded during the 1993 trial 
to make the several gross factual misrepresentations.344 First, 
they stated the Brace’s had not farmed or pastured the land.345 
Rather, the Government argued there was no established ongoing 
farming despite actions, like leveling and spreading, intended to 
create farming opportunities.346 The Government also argued the 
Brace’s convergence of a wetland to pastureland was not 
considered farming and in fact was merely “hacking around in a 
wetland.”347 Apparently, USG counsel had ignored the 1993 EPA-
Corps joint regulations, which directed EPA and the Corps to 
broadly follow SCS’ application of the NFSAM Part 512 prior 
converted cropland and abandonment rules, which could be 
reasonably interpreted as containing a “non-degradation clause” 
protecting wetlands as they existed as of the date of the FSA’s 
enactment.348  
 
342 See ECF No. 279, supra note 80 at 61–62. 
343 See id. at 35, n.11 
344 See generally ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335.  
345 ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335, at 10. 
346 Id. at 538.  
347 Id. at 538–39. 
348 See Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472, 474-475 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the 1996 amendment to the 1985 Swampbuster provisions of 16 U.S.C. § 
3821-24, which “added an exception for wetlands that had been drained and farmed, had 
reverted to wetland status, and then were restored to agricultural use… [i.e., for a] 
‘wetland previously identified as a converted wetland (if the original conversion of the 
wetland was commenced before December 23, 1985)’ […] [was] a non-degradation clause: 
the legislation protect[ed] wetlands as they actually existed on the date of [the FSA’s] 
enactment.”); see also Orchard Hill Building Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No.15-
cv-06344 (N.D. Ill 2017), slip op. at 10 (noting how, due to “differing standards among” the 
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  Section V.A of the joint EPA/Corps August 25, 1993 
regulations emphasizes the overall federal policy goal of ensuring 
consistency in the implementation of both the CWA and FSA 
with respect to activities undertaken on agricultural lands.349  
 
We believe […] that effective implementation of the 
wetlands provisions of the Act [FSA] without 
unduly confusing the public and regulated 
community is vital to achieving the environmental 
protection goals of the Clean Water Act. The CWA 
is not administered in a vacuum. Statutes other 
than the CWA and agencies other than EPA and 
the Corps have become an integral part of the 
federal wetlands effort. We believe that this effort 
will be most effective if the agencies involved have, 
to the extent possible, consistent and compatible 
approaches to insuring wetlands protection. We 
believe that this rule achieves this policy goal in a 
manner consistent with the language and 
objectives of the CWA. (emphasis added).350 
 
As these regulations state, furthermore, the EPA and the 
Corps “believe that farmers should generally be able to rely on 
SCS wetlands determinations for purposes of complying with 
both the Swampbuster program and the Section 404 program.”351 
Such regulatory consistency (harmony) will be achieved by 
“recognizing SCS’s expertise in making [] PC cropland 
determinations” and by “continu[ing] to rely generally on 
determinations made by SCS.” (emphasis added).352 This goal also 
will be achieved by having the EPA and the Corps utilize the 
NFSAM in the same manner as USDA-SCS, in conjunction with 
other agency guidance documents, presumably, the Corps’s 1987 
Wetlands Delineation Manual: 
 
 
Corps, EPA, and NRCS (formerly the SCS), “farmers often found it difficult to comply with 
all three sets of regulations. Thus in 1993, an effort to provide consistency between the 
three agencies, the Corps and EPA jointly adopted a rule implementing the NRCS’s 
[SCS’s] prior conversion exemption for purposes of the CWA. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(2).”). 
349 See Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45031–32 
(Aug. 25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R). 
350 Id.  
351 Id. at 45033. 
352 Id.  




We believe that consistency with SCS policy will 
best be achieved by our utilizing the NFSAM in the 
same manner as SCS, i.e., as a guidance document 
used in conjunction with other appropriate 
technical guidance and field-testing techniques to 
determine whether an area is prior converted 
cropland. […] EPA and the Corps will […] 
implement this exclusion in a manner following the 
guidance contained in the NFSAM and appropriate 
field delineation techniques, and will continue to 
rely, to the extent appropriate, on determinations 
made by the SCS. […] The fact that we have not 
incorporated by reference the actual provisions of 
the NFSAM into our rules does not undercut our 
ability to maintain consistency. Rather, as 
explained above, we believe that utilizing the 
NFSAM as a guidance manual, as it is used by 
SCS, will enhance consistency in the 
administration of the Food Security and Clean 
Water Act programs (emphasis added).353 
 
Section V.B of the 1993 joint agency regulations further 
identifies how the FSA’s distinction between farmed wetlands 
and prior converted cropland serves as a reasonable basis to 
distinguish between wetlands and non-wetlands under the CWA: 
 
In utilizing the SCS definition of PC cropland for 
purposes of Section 404 of the CWA, we are 
attempting, in an area where there is not a clear 
technical answer, to make the difficult distinction 
between those agricultural areas that retain 
wetland character sufficiently that they should be 
regulated under Section 404, and those areas that 
[have] been so modified that they should fall 
outside the scope of the CWA. […] We believe that 
the distinctions under the Food Security Act 
between PC cropland and farmed wetlands 
provides a reasonable basis for distinguishing 
between wetlands and non-wetlands under the 
 
353 Id. 
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CWA. In addition to the fact that we believe this 
distinction is an appropriate one based on the 
ecological goals and objectives of the CWA, 
adopting the SCS approach in this area will also 
help achieve the very important policy goal of 
achieving consistency among federal programs 
affecting wetlands. (emphasis added).354  
 
To recall, the jointly issued 1993 EPA-Corps regulations 
stated a very important “policy goal of achieving consistency 
among federal programs affecting wetlands” which the agencies 
believed, in light of the FSA’s enactment, was “vital to achieving 
the environmental protection goals of the Clean Water Act.”355 
They also emphasized “the CWA is not administered in a 
vacuum.”356 Thus, the distinction these regulations had made 
between farmed wetlands and prior converted cropland can be 
more broadly understood as the distinction between non-
converted wetlands and “converted wetlands” for both CWA and 
FSA purposes.357   
The 1993 joint EPA-Corps regulations offer the 
grandfather provisions of Sections V.H and III.G as an additional 
basis to conclude that actively pursued non-disrupted prior 
commenced conversions and prior converted croplands should be 
treated similarly for CWA and FSA purposes.358 Section V.H is a 
subsection of Section V of the regulations entitled, “Revision to 
the Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ to Exclude Prior 
Converted Cropland.”359 Section V generally recognizes prior 
converted croplands (“PC”) as converted wetlands that no longer 
meet the 3-parameter wetlands definition set forth in the 1987 
Corps Wetlands Delineation Manual, and thus, as falling outside 
the definition of WOTUS for both CWA and FSA purposes, under 
33 CFR § 328.3(a)(8) and 40 CFR § 232.2.360  
Section V.H, however, precluded exclusion from the 
definition of WOTUS, and thus, from § 404 jurisdiction, of all 
 
354 Id. at 45032.  
355 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45031–32 (Aug. 
25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R.).  
356 Id. at 45031. 
357 Id. at 45032. 
358 See id. at 45031–33.  
359 Id. at 45031.  
360 See id. at 45031–33.  




converted wetlands “that were converted to prior converted 
cropland [(“PC”)] between 1972 and 1985 as a result of 
unauthorized discharges of dredged or fill material” (emphasis 
added).361 This prohibition seemed to apply to all previously non-
permitted/unauthorized wetlands conversion activities that relied 
upon a post-December 23, 1985 USDA-ASCS determination that 
they had been completed by December 23, 1985, and thus, 
qualified for PC status.362  
Section III.G is a subsection of Section III of the 
regulations entitled, “Revisions to Definition of ‘Discharge of 
Dredged Material 33 CFR 323.2(d) and 40 CFR 232.2(e).”363 It 
appears to have been applied to cover prior converted croplands 
not qualifying under the grandfather provision of Subsection V.H. 
Section III, in accordance with CWA § 404 permitting, generally 
covered all discharges of dredged material into a WOTUS unless 
an applicable permitting exemption applied.364 Section III.G, 
however, provided grandfather protection to exclude from the 
new definition “certain ‘discharges of dredged material’ that, in 
some Corps districts, were not considered to be subject to 
regulation under the previous definition of that term.” (emphasis 
added).365  
This latter grandfather provision had been intended to 
end the practice by different Corps districts of exercising their 
discretion and reaching inconsistent results which the regulated 
public had deemed unfair and inequitable.366 It excluded from 
CWA § 404 permitting “discharges of dredged material associated 
with ditching, channelization, and other excavation activities in 
[WOTUS] where such discharges were not previously regulated 
and where such activities had commenced or were under contract 
prior to the date of publication of this final rule in the Federal 
Register.”367 These activities, if performed in a wetlands by a 
farmer, can easily be considered activities undertaken incident to 
the “conversion” of pastured or hayed wetlands to a crop farming 
use. In addition, such activities had to be “completed within one 
 
361 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45034 (Aug. 25, 
1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R.).  
362 Id. at 45027. 
363 Id. at 45009–10.  
364 See id. 
365 Id. at 45027. 
366 Id. 
367 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45027, 45037 (Aug. 25, 
1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R.).   
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year from the date of publication of the final rule” (i.e., by Aug. 
25, 1994).368  
Section III.G provided an extension of the one-year 
grandfather period to “further ensure that implementation of the 
revised definition proceed[ed] in a fair and equitable manner.”369 
The Corps could issue an extension concerning the grandfather 
clause on a case-by-case basis until August 25, 1996, depending 
on whether the discharger could demonstrate the activity was (1) 
pursued continuously or periodically, (2) submitted to the Corps a 
completed 404 individual permit for review by August 25, 1994, 
and (3) ensured such excavation activity did not continue beyond 
August 25, 1996.370 If all three conditions had been met, the 
Corps allowed the discharger to complete the activity while the 
district office reviewed his/her permit application.371  
 
B. USDA-NFSAM’s Broad Approach for Exempting Previously 
Farmed Wetlands Converted for Crop Production 
 
The SCS had used Part 512 of the NFSAM entitled 
“Wetland Conservation” to address various issues related to the 
conversion of wetlands for possible crop production.372 NFSAM § 
512.20(a), for example, states the SCS was responsible for 
determining whether federally assisted project activities in a 
wetland constituted a “prior conversion,” which is “a wetland 
alteration completed prior to December 23, 1985.”373 NFSAM § 
512.22(b)(3)(vii) states SCS also was responsible for determining 
 
368 Id. 
369 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45009–10 (Aug. 
25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R).  
370 Id. at 45027. 
371 Id. (At least one Corps district office notified the public that it had interpreted 
the one-year (to August 25, 1994) grandfather provision of Section III.G of these joint 1993 
regulations as having excluded wetland conversion activities, such as ditching, 
channelization, and/or other excavation activities, presumably including side-casting and 
grubbing and clearing of sedimentation and debris inundated channel overbank and 
contiguous and adjacent areas. This means the Corps district office had interpreted the 
grandfather provision as covering both CWA § 404-unauthorized prior converted 
croplands and unauthorized prior commenced conversions of wetlands that would not 
have qualified under the Section V.H grandfather provision. See reproducing U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers Walla, Walla District, Informational Public Notice: Excavation 
Activities, Placement of Pilings, and Prior Converted Cropland at 3 (Sept. 17, 1993), 
Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 279-185. 
372 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., NATIONAL FOOD 
SECURITY ACT MANUAL, SECOND EDITION at 512.20 (1988), Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF 
No. 279-66.  
373 Id.  




how much conversion had occurred. This is based on the amount 
of work completed, the materials purchased before December 23, 
1985, and what work was completed, or planned for, either 
through contracting or materials.374  
NFSAM § 512.22(b)(3)(vi) indicates such SCS 
determination, however, is typically dependent on the ASCS 
having first determined “Federally assisted project activities 
which convert wetlands or provide outlets for persons to convert 
wetlands for the production of an agricultural commodity […had] 
started before December 23, 1985.”375 In other words, such SCS 
determination requires first the ASCS had determined a 
commenced conversion had occurred because (1) conversion 
activities had already begun, or (2) funds were legally committed 
or otherwise expended, either through contracting or the 
purchase of materials.376 In addition, NFSAM § 512.22(b)(3)(v) 
indicates such SCS determination also is dependent on the ASCS 
having first consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
about the “commenced determination” it is evaluating.377 
Most interesting, and arguably, most significant, is 
NFSAM § 512.31 entitled, “Use of Prior Converted Croplands 
(PC),” which groups together both pre-December 23, 1985 
completed (prior) conversions AND pre-December 23, 1985 
commenced conversions under one category of “converted 
wetlands” (“CW”) eligible for one or more of the FSA 
exemptions.378 NFSAM § 512.31 excludes any wetland converted 
before December 23, 1985 from the provisions of the FSA.379 
Individuals may continue to maintain and even improve drainage 
systems put in place on areas classified as prior converted 
wetlands, with the provison that conversion of new wetlands does 
not occur.380 NFSAM § 512.31(a) considers wetlands given a 
commenced conversion determination as “prior conversions when 
the commenced activities are completed.”381 The area must also 
meet the prior converted cropland criteria and be completed 
before January 1, 1995.382  
 
 374 Id. at § 512.22 (b)(3)(vii)..  
375 Id. at § 512 (b)(1)(i)-(ii).   
376 Id.  
377 Id. at 512.22(b)(3)(v).   
378 Id. at 512.31.  
379 Id. at 512.31.  
380 Id.  
381 Id. at 512.31(a).  
382 Id.  
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NFSAM § 512.31(b) precludes landowners who obtained a 
prior commenced conversion (“CC”) determination for a given 
area (field) from converting “additional wetland acres beyond that 
which ha[d] been determined to be commenced.”383 This 
treatment is consistent with NFSAM § 512.31’s prohibition 
against landowners bearing a prior completed conversion (“PC”) 
determination converting any additional wetlands.384 NFSAM § 
512.36 shows this consistency of treatment between prior 
conversions and commenced conversions in a chart entitled, 
“Summary of Use, Maintenance and Improvements of Various 




Use Maintenance Improvement 
Prior Conversion 
(PC) Converted 












Yes  Yes 
 
 NFSAM § 512.32(a), furthermore, distinguishes the post-
December 23, 1985 use of lands designated pre-December 23, 
1985 commenced conversions from the use of post-December 23, 
1985 converted wetlands (CW) “not subject to one or more of the 
exemptions.”386 Moreover, NFSAM § 512.35(c) distinguishes the 
use of pre-December 23, 1985 commenced conversions from 
farmed wetlands (“FW”) of the kind discussed in Corps RGL 90-
07.387 The limitations the 1987 final USDA regulations impose 
 
383 Id. at 512.31(b).  
384 See Gunn v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 118 F.3d 1233, 1235 (8th Cir. 
1997) (holding wetlands that were converted to production of agricultural commodities 
before the cutoff date of December 23, 1985, “can continue to be farmed without the loss of 
benefits, but only so long as the previously accomplished drainage or manipulation is not 
significantly improved upon, so that wetland characteristics are further degraded in a 
significant way.”). 
385 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.36.  
386 Id. at § 512.32(a). 
387 See Gunn v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 118 F.3d at 1238 (stressing 
USDA’s distinction between wetlands and converted wetlands and identifying fields that a 




upon the post-December 23, 1985 use of non-converted farmed 
wetlands are analogous to the limitations placed upon prior 
commenced conversions and prior completed conversions in only 
one respect: they prevent further drainage of the wetland as it 
previously existed on December 23, 1985.388 
 Finally, NFSAM § 512.16(a)-(c), like the September 17, 
1987 final USDA regulations discussed above, set forth the USDA 
standard for “abandonment” which the August 25, 1993 joint 
EPA/Corps regulations directed such agencies to follow.389 In 
such, the standard for abandonment is “is the cessation of 
cropping, management, or maintenance operations on prior 
converted croplands or farmed wetland.”390 The regulation goes 
on to define cropping, management or maintenance.391 Cropping 
involves the rotation of grasses, legumes or other pasture 
products relating to development of an agricultural commodity.392 
Actions which support cropping, including “tillage, planting, 
mowing, harvesting, repair of drainage systems, etc.,” are 
considered management or maintenance. 393  
To consider a prior converted wetland abandoned, the 
wetland must be both (1) unused, unmanaged or unmaintained 
for 5 successive years; and (2) not be involved in a USDA 
 
farmer failed to demonstrate as having been “commenced converted” pre-Dec. 23, 1985 as 
likely “farmed wetlands.”); Barthel v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 181 F.3d 934, slip 
op. at 6 (characterizing the farmer’s land, which had not been designated either as “prior 
converted” or “commenced converted,” consistent with NFSAM § 5.14.23(a) as “‘farmed 
wetland pasture or hayland” i.e., as “wetlands that were manipulated and used for 
pasture or hayland prior to December 23, 1985, [which] still meet wetland criteria”…); See 
also 52 Fed. Reg. at 35208 (Sept. 17, 1987). 
388 See Barthel, 181 F.3d at 937-938, 939 (holding with respect to non-converted 
farmed wetlands, that the then “current [USDA] regulation on ‘use of wetland and 
converted wetland’ provides that changes in the watershed due to human activity which 
increases the water regime on a person’s land, can result in a person being allowed ‘to 
adjust the existing drainage system to accommodate the increased water regime.’ 7 C.F.R. 
§ 12.33(a),” provided “’the previously accomplished drainage or manipulation is not 
significantly improved upon , so that wetland characteristics are further degraded in a 
significant way’”).  
389 52 Fed. Reg. at 35195-6, 7 CFR § 12.33(b) (2019).  
390 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.16(a)-(c).  
391 Id. at 512.16(a)-(c).  
392 The 1987 USDA regulations similarly provide that, “grasses not tilled annually […] do 
not meet the definition of an agricultural commodity,” while “grass[es…] used as a high 
residue crop in a crop rotation, as distinguished from permanent hayland or grassland, 
the existing crop rotation and management techniques may be considered an acceptable 
conservation system for the field.” (emphasis added). See 52 Fed. Reg. at 35196 (Sept. 17, 
1987).  
393 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.16(a)-(c).  
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conservation or restoration program.394 Wetlands found to be 
abandoned are then classified as wetlands and fall under specific 
wetland provisions.395 Much like the Corps’ 1986 final 
regulations,396 the NFSAM definition of “abandonment,” in effect, 
treats agricultural ditch maintenance and tile drainage system 
repair and replacement related to a prior converted cropland, a 
prior commenced conversion when completed, or a previously 
farmed wetland, as the normal farming activities of an 
established farming operation, where grasslands (e.g., hay) and 




Given the similarities and distinctions discussed, the U.S. 
District Court in United States v. Brace should conclude that 
USDA-SCS had previously determined Defendants’ Murphy tract 
qualified as an FSA-“converted wetland” (“CW”) because it had 
undergone a much more extensive degree of conversion than what 
is characteristic of a farmed wetland subject to CWA § 404 
permitting pursuant to Corps RGL 86-9 and Corps RGL 90-07. 
Given these similarities and distinctions, USDA-ASCS 
determined the pre-December 23, 1985 activities and expenses 
Mr. Brace had undertaken and incurred on the Murphy farm 
tract had constituted a prior commenced conversion rendering it 
eligible to receive USDA subsidies and to be treated as a prior 
converted cropland when completed.  
In 1986 and 1987, Mr. Brace planted and harvested rye, 
oats and hay crops within the Murphy farm tract’s 30-acre 
area.398 This was the only remaining step necessary to qualify his 
prior commenced conversion (“CC”) of that area as a prior 
converted cropland (“PC”) under the FSA.399 It was only in 
September 1988 that Mr. Brace secured from USDA-ASCS the 
commenced conversion designation for Field 14, which 
engendered a look-back to the conversion work he continuously 
pursued from 1977 through December 23, 1985.400 Given Mr. 
 
394 Id.  
395 Id.  See also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(9) (2020). 
396 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(ii) (1986).  
397 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.16(a)-(c). 
398 See generally ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335. 
399 See generally id.  
400 See id.  




Brace’s planting and harvesting of rye, oats and hay crops in 
1986 and 1987, USDA-ASCS only had designated the area as a 
CC rather than a PC.401  
Once Mr. Brace obtained his CC, he would likely have 
been able to complete that prior commenced conversion of the 
Murphy farm tract by 1989 or 1990, significantly earlier than the 
January 1, 1995 statutory deadline. Mr. Brace was certainly on 
track to do just that, but for, the United States’s successful 
disruption of it, which had been beyond his control to prevent.402 
Moreover, the District Court may reasonably conclude Mr. Brace 
had not “abandoned” his normal farming activities or his 
“commenced conversion” of the Murphy farm tract. Mr. Brace’s 
prior “commenced conversion, once completed by 1989 or 1990, 
would have been treated as prior converted cropland excluded 
from CWA § 404 jurisdiction pursuant to the retroactive 
application of the 1993 joint EPA-Corps regulations broadly 
applying the NFSAM “converted wetland” (“CW”) provisions. 
In overturning the District Court’s ruling in favor of the 
Braces, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals metaphorically “drank 
the Kool-Aid” comprised of unreliable legislative history snippets 
and wetland-related environmental zealotry bereft of supporting 
statutory text and common sense. Instead, the Appellate Court 
neglected to examine and determine the proper and correct plain 
textual meaning of the term “converted wetlands” for purposes of 
both Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 404 and Food Security Act of 
1985 (“FSA”) §§ 1204 and 1222. Had a proper plain textual 
meaning been applied in the original action at bar, Mr. Brace 
would have been enabled to complete his USDA-authorized prior 
commenced conversion of the Murphy tract 30-acre area (and of 
the adjacent Marsh tract 11-acre area).403 Such a result would 
have been consistent with Congress’s expressed intent of using 
the FSA as the prescribed doorway through which farmers, like 
Mr. Brace, could proceed CWA-permit-free to rotate their 
historically mixed agricultural land use from natural and 
cultivated wetland pasturing and haying to more productive 
cropping in furtherance of the nation’s efforts to both promote 
agriculture, preserve wetlands and control soil erosion.  
 
401 See id.  
402 See id.  
403 See ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 41, 49. 
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As the USDA-SCS’s former state biologist for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recently testified, “in 
Pennsylvania, it was merely a matter – for forested sites, it was 
merely a matter of taking the trees out and pull[ing] the stumps 
out. That was a conversion.”404 He also testified “that the NFSAM 
only had required Pennsylvania landowners operating north of 
the 40th parallel (i.e., located north of the southern Pittsburgh 
metro area) ‘in areas that [originally] were forested […] to […] 
clear it and plant it to an agricultural commodity,’ to secure a 
prior converted cropland (“PC”) designation” – i.e., for it to 
become a PC.405 “It never had to be effectively drained [to be 
converted…] [s]o there’s a lot of PC in Pennsylvania that still has 
wetland hydrology and is on hydric soils.”406 Consequently, if an 
Erie farmer had cleared stems and stumps from a formerly 
wooded area and then planted a crop before December 23, 1985, 
“USDA would have designated that area as ‘PC,’ even if it had 
not effectively been drained and still effectively met the wetland 
hydrology parameter.”407 
In addition, the USDA Pennsylvania state biologist 
testified that Mr. Brace had received in 1988 the first, if not the 
only, USDA-authorized/designated “commenced conversion” 
within Pennsylvania.408 He also testified that he hadn’t been 
previously involved in any commenced conversion determination 
under the FSA outside Pennsylvania, and that he had not been 
aware Mr. Brace possessed a soil and water conservation plan he 
acquired in the mid-1970’s and then updated.409 Yet, both he and 
the USDA-SCS Conservationist proceeded to determine verbally, 
without reference to any USDA form documents, maps or images 
relating to Brace’s commenced conversion (e.g., USDA-ASCS 
Form AD-1026 and attached map, USDA-SCS-CPA-026, etc.),410 
that the Murphy farm tract deserved the designation of 
“converted wetlands” (“CW”) for FSA purposes.411  
Finally, the District Court may reasonably conclude, the 
balance of equities tilt in Brace’s favor because of the recently 
 
404 Barry Isaacs Dep. at 26:2-4, Jan. 26, 2018, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 
279-56. 
405 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 53.  
406 Id. at 53-54; ECF No. 279-56, supra note 404, at 21:8–23:14.  
407 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 54.  
408 ECF No. 279-56, supra note 404, at 18:6-19:16. 
409 Id. at 31:8–34:21. 
410 Id. at 35:12–38:1; ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 39–40. 
411 See ECF No. 279-56, supra note 404, at 30:17-32:12. 




presented findings contained in Defendants’ filings and expert 
reports. The Defendants’ wetlands expert report rebuts the 
scientific validity of EPA’s 1989-1990 wetlands delineation report 
which failed to meet the standards of the 1987 Corps Wetland 
Delineation Manual.412 It also indicates that EPA’s wetland 
evaluation ignored how Defendants had historically used the 
Murphy tract, along with two adjacent Brace farm tracts, as a 
single mixed agricultural farm engaged in cropping, cultivating 
hay, and cultivated and natural pasturing since the 1930’s.413  
The report also confirms how Brace had thereafter been 
prevented from removing recurring beaver dams on and around 
the site due to federal agency imposition of time-consuming and 
costly permit review processes which enabled the beaver dams to 
transform the wetland hydrology of the site in the interim.414 
Furthermore, said report corroborated the findings of the U.S. 
Court of Claims that the Murphy tract had been mostly dry by 
1979,415 until approximately 1993, and that the purpose of the 
1996 consent decree was “to restore what one EPA official 
described as the ‘hydrologic drive of the[] wetlands’ to where it 
was in 1985.”416 
Moreover, the corrected report of Defendants’ 
hydraulic/hydrologic engineering experts explains the 
quantitative hydraulic impact on Brace farm channel surface 
water levels and channel overbank and adjacent and contiguous 
areas, of five beaver dams present within and beyond the Murphy 
farm tract CDA, plus the qualitative impact of an additional large 
beaver dam located to the northwest of the Murphy farm tract 
CDA.417  
Therefore, it remains more than possible the District 
Court may decide to exercise its equitable powers to ensure 
 
412 Kagel Environmental, LLC Murphy Tract Wetland Rebuttal R. at 22-26, 
Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 279-199. 
413 This finding was consistent with Defendants’s more recent discovery 
contained in the documented materials supporting a U.S. National Park Service National 
Historic Place Registry filing. Those documented materials provide historical proof that 
mixed agriculture had historically been practiced in Waterford Township and Erie County 
since, at least, the 1830’s. See ECF 279, supra note 80, at 40.  
414 ECF No. 279-199, supra note 412, at 45–48. 
415 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 63; see Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 343 (2006). 
416 72 Fed. Cl. at 344; see Jeffrey Lapp Dep. at 610:6-19, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-
00229, ECF No. 279-8.  
417 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 87–91 (citing Hydrologic and Hydraulic 
Evaluation of Elk Creek on the Robert Brace Farm, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 
279-42). 
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justice is done in this action. Unfortunately, neither EPA nor the 
Corps had exercised their equitable discretion in favor of Mr. 
Brace before the 1993 bench trial, even though a joint agency 
administrative guidance issued barely two months after the 
original action had been filed would have directed them to do so. 
EPA and Corps enforcement personnel could have decided, as a 
matter of equity, not to refer Mr. Brace’s case to DOJ-ENRD for 
civil prosecution because Mr. Brace had received misinformation 
from USG agency personnel upon which he reasonably relied 
regarding whether the discharge required a 404 permit.418  
In sum, considering the prior EPA and Corps failure to 
examine the “equitable considerations” surrounding the Brace’s 
case prior to initiating the 1990 enforcement action, the Brace 
District Court may now reasonably conclude justice and equity in 
the current CD enforcement action warrants such consideration. 
The District Court, therefore, should exercise its equitable powers 
to harmonize the plain text meaning of the term “converted 
wetlands” for both CWA § 404 and FSA §§ 1204 and 1222 
purposes. This would enable Mr. Brace to complete his prior 
commenced conversion of the Murphy farm tract’s approximate 
30-acre area, which he would have accomplished in 1989 or 1990 
by the planting and harvesting of crops (i.e., production of an 
agricultural commodity), but for the Government’s improper 
disrupting actions.  
 
418 See EPA-Corps Guidance on Judicial Civil and Criminal Enforcement 
Priorities (12-12-90), at 3, discussed in Defendants’ Redrafted Opposition/Response to 
United States Second Motion to Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties, 
para. 21, at 17–19.  
